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Abstract
This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behav-
ior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous
domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative.
Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but non-
trivial, requirements for rationalizability, I show that the hypothesis is
falsifiable, as it imposes nontautological, nonparametric testable restric-
tions. An assessment of these restrictions, however, shows that they are
extremely weak, and that a researcher should expect, before observing
the data set, that the test based on these restrictions will be passed by
observed data. Without further specific assumptions, there do not ex-
ist harsher tests, since the conditions derived here also turn out to be
suﬃcient. Moreover, ruling out the possibility that individuals may be
cooperating so as to attain Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes is impossible, as this
behavior is in itself unfalsifiable with finite data sets. Imposing aggrega-
tion, or strategic complementarity and/or substitutability, if theoretically
plausible, may provide for a harsher test.
Keywords: Game theory, testable restrictions, revealed preferences.
JEL classification: C71, C72, C92, D70.
1 Introduction:
The standard for what is to be considered scientific knowledge has been a promi-
nent topic of debate in Epistemology. One of the most influential philosophers
of the last century, Karl Popper, argued that scientists should actively try to
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Individually-Rational Choice and Equilibrium.” I would like to thank my main advisor,
Herakles Polemarchakis, for his guidance, patience and support. Comments by Indrajit Ray,
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Simposio Colombiano de Microeconomia are also gratefully acknowledged. I thank Brown and
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prove their theories wrong, rather than merely trying to verify them through
inductive reasoning. Hausman (1992) summarizes the methodology of Popper
as three simple rules:
“(1) Propose and consider only testable or falsifiable theories;
(2) seek only to falsify scientific theories; (3) accept theories that
withstand attempts to falsify them as worthy of further discussion,
never as certain...”
Accordingly, the Popperian postulate sustains that scientific discovery ought
to follow four steps: (i) the internal consistency of a theory must be formally
checked, to verify that it contains no logical inconsistencies; (ii) the logical prin-
ciples of the theory must be distinguished from its empirical implications; (iii)
the theory must be compared with alternative existing theoretical knowledge
that has not been refuted by empirical evidence, in order to ascertain whether
it can explain phenomena that cannot be explained by the existing knowledge;
(iv) finally, the theory must be submitted to tests of its empirical implications,
in order for it to be corroborated (but not verified) or refuted.1 Interesting tests
are those that are “harsh,” in the sense that, a priori, the theory would appear
likely to fail them. And if a theory fails a test, and there exists no reasonable
excuse that can itself be tested, then the theory should be abandoned.2
This “empiricist” position, often referred to as “Falsificationism,” had been
previously exposed by one of the greatest mathematicians of the Nineteenth
Century, Henri Poincaré, who in 1908 wrote that3 “...when a theory has been
established, we have first to look for cases in which the rule stands the best
chance of being found at fault.” The principle was introduced to economics
by Paul Samuelson, for whom “meaningful theorems” are hypotheses “... about
empirical data which could conceivably be refuted” (see Samuelson (1947), p.4).
Over the last decades, game theory has arisen as a prominent field in math-
ematics and economics, allowing for logically consistent and extremely elegant
explanations of human behavior under interaction. The development of the
theory was built largely upon the concept of Nash equilibrium, which came
to be applied in many diﬀerent problems, and extended and refined in many
diﬀerent ways. Nonetheless, few attempts to derive harsh empirical tests of
1Godel´s undecidability principle shows that within the logical scope of any axiomatic
theory there exist propositions whose truth or falsehood cannot be established based only on
the axioms of the theory (the principles of point (ii)). One should not conclude from this
that every theory is unfalsifiable: falsifiability requires that logical propositions, which can
actually be proven from the logical principles, should be contrastable with reality, so as to
ascertain the refutability of the logical principles of the theory. Those propositions whose
logical validity cannot be ascertained from the axioms of the theory are out of the scope of
the falsifiactionist method.
2The Popperian view has found strong criticism. For example, Hausman (1992) criticizes
the position that one should only try to falsify theories, treating them as nothing more than
“...conjectures ... worth of criticism,” which Hausman finds “outrageous” (see chapter 6. Quo-
tations are from page 81.) For a defense of (some of) the Popperian postulate, see Hutchison
(1994).
3 See Zalah (2001).
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these developments have appeared in the literature. In terms of the Popperian
rules, this would cast doubt on predictions derived from applications of game
theoretical concepts, which should not be treated as scientific, for only testable
ideas deserve such treatment. In terms of the steps of scientific discovery pre-
sented in the introduction, game theory still needs to strengthen its position by
completing step (ii) and then allowing for applications of step (iv).
Even if one considers the views of Popper to be too extreme,4 it seems
desirable to obtain testable implications from game theoretical concepts that
can prove inadequate their applications to specific problems. This paper studies
the existence testable implications of the application of Nash equilibrium to
an abstract situation in which finitely many agents individually choose from
continuous domains, subject to constraints, and their satisfaction depends on
the collective choice. I assume all the principles behind the concept of Nash
equilibrium, namely that each agent acts as if he were choosing a most satisfying
alternative, according to some preferences, while taking as given what the others
are, in eﬀect, doing. Preferences, of course, are not subject to tests, since they
cannot be observed. But if one assumes that choices are observed, the following
question can be asked: when can one say that the principles of Nash behavior
cannot explain the observed choices? I propose an answer to this question in
the form of testable restrictions and study how harsh a test these restrictions
provide for.
The results are rather negative: (i) the power of the test derived from the
restrictions is nil, (ii) there does not exist a more powerful test of the general
hypothesis, as these restrictions are all the empirical implications of the hypoth-
esis; and (iii) one can never rule out the alternative hypothesis that individuals
are cooperating. Hence only under further or stronger assumptions may the
hypothesis of Nash equilibrium be really refutable.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I survey the existing results
that are related to this paper, and point out the diﬀerences between the prob-
lems addressed here and there. Section 3 explains the specific problem that I
deal with, derives the testable implications of my application of the Nash equi-
librium concept, studies how harsh these restrictions are and whether one could
find harsher tests. Section 4 then compares the empirical implications of the
application of the Nash equilibrium concept with the ones that arise from a
prominent alternative hypothesis, namely that individuals cooperate to always
choose Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes. Section 5 studies whether imposing additional
conditions, whose validity would have to be evaluated in specific applications,
can result in harsher tests of the theory. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding re-
marks.
4Modern defenders of Falsificationism maintain more moderate positions. See Hutchison
(1994).
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2 Review of the literature:
There exist few results regarding the existence of testable restrictions of appli-
cations of game theoretical concepts. In unpublished work, Zhou (1999) studies
the following problem: suppose that there are two individuals, each of whom
chooses form some (fixed) interval from the real line, and suppose that one is
given a finite subset of the Cartesian product of the two intervals. Zhou deter-
mines conditions on this set, which are equivalent to the existence of individual
preferences such that the “observed set” is the Nash set of the game played by
the two individuals if they have those preferences.5 Given that there do exist
sets that violate Zhou’s condition, one concludes that, upon observation of the
finite set, the hypothesis that these observations, and only these observations,
may come from Nash behavior is refutable.
A similar problem, for the case of finite domains, is considered by Sprumont
(2000), who studies a game played by a finite set of players, each of whom
can choose from a finite set. Suppose that one constructs a collective budget
by choosing for each individual a nonempty subset of his choice set and then
taking their Cartesian product, and that one “observes” a nonempty subset of
it, as being chosen as the collective outcome. If we did this for all possible
collective budgets we could construct an outcome correspondence mapping the
collection of all collective choices to their chosen subsets. This correspondence
would depend only on observables. The question that Sprumont answers is:
what conditions does this correspondence have to satisfy if for each individual
there exists a preference relation over the collective choice set such that the
correspondence maps each collective budget to its Nash set under those pref-
erences. Sprumont finds conditions that are necessary and suﬃcient for the
rationalizability of the outcome correspondence in the mentioned sense.6 Given
that there are correspondences that violate these conditions, Sprumont con-
cludes that, upon observation of the outcome correspondence, the application
of Nash behavior to this kind of problems is falsifiable.
The analysis in Sprumont focuses on normal form games. The almost perfect
analogous for extensive-form games with perfect information is Ray and Zhou
(2001). Suppose that we have a finite, extensive-form game, and that we can
observe an outcome function mapping the set of reduced games7 of the original
game into the set of its terminal nodes. Zhou and Ray study conditions under
which, for each individual, there exists an order over the terminal nodes such
5Zhou assumes that preferences are representable by utility functions that are continuous
and quasiconcave in own action. The condition that he finds, which he calls “no improper
crossing,” implies that the best response functions of individuals do not intersect at points
other than the elements of the set.
6The first condition, “persistence under expansion,” is satisfied if whenever an outcome
is chosen in two diﬀerent members of the collection of collective budgets, it is also chosen
in the smaller member of this collection that contains their union. The second condition,
“persistence under contraction,” says, subject to some qualification, that when going from a
larger to a smaller member of the collection, the outcomes chosen in the larger member that
“survive” the contraction should also be chosen in the smaller member.
7A reduced game is defined by a subset of the original three that contains some terminal
nodes, and all the nonterminal nodes that belong to paths leading to them.
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that the image of each reduced game under the outcome function is its subgame-
perfect equilibrium if individual preferences were precisely those orders.8 Ray
and Zhou also show that their conditions are independent, and that examples
that violate one of them are not rationalizable in the mentioned sense, even if
they satisfy the other two. The conclusion is again that, upon observation of
such an outcome function, the results of applying the concept of subgame-perfect
equilibrium to this kind of problems are falsifiable.
These three works consider the behavioral principles behind the Nash equi-
librium concept. In contrast, Chiappori (1988) considers the implications of
cooperative behavior in a less abstract setting. Suppose that one observes a
two-member household, each of whose members derives utility from his or her
own consumption and leisure, as well as from the ones of the other member,
facing a joint budget constraint. The question that Chiappori answers is: do
there exist conditions on the observations of individual labor supply and ag-
gregate consumption under which there exist individual preferences such that
the observations are Pareto-eﬃcient collective decisions, under these preferences
and given (observed) individual wages? Chiappori shows that such conditions
indeed exist,9 and are both necessary and suﬃcient, and that there exist obser-
vations that could not be rationalized in the mentioned sense. It is concluded
that the principles of Pareto behavior applied in this particular setting produce
a falsifiable hypothesis.
The present paper is mostly related to Zhou (1999) and Sprumont (2000).
The problem considered here is the following: suppose that one observes a fi-
nite set of players, each of whom chooses from an interval from the real line.
A constraint is modeled as a lower and an upper bound to what a player can
choose. Suppose that one observes a finite sequence of profiles of constraints
and choices. In this paper I ask the question of what conditions on this sequence
are necessary (and suﬃcient) for the existence of individual preferences over the
Cartesian product of all intervals, such that for each observed profile of con-
straints, the corresponding observed profile of choices is a Nash equilibrium of
the game played under the constrained domain if individuals have these prefer-
ences. (Trivial answers to the question are ruled out by assumptions explained
below.)
The interest in continuous domains is easily motivated. Suppose that the
government is trying to provide a public good and would like the consumers
8There are three necessary and suﬃcient conditions. The first one, which Ray and Zhou call
“acyclicity,” says that for each player the (incomplete) binary relation of revealed preferences
derived from the function must be acyclic. The second condition, “internal consistency,”
requires that the outcome of a reduced game, say a, be always also the outcome of all reduced
games that can be defined as follows: if a0 is a predecessor of a, take the reduced game
defined using as terminal nodes all those terminal nodes that defined the original game and
are successors of a0. The third condition, called “subgame consistency,” requires that if a is
the outcome of a reduced game, then at each node leading to a, the player whose turn it is to
move should choose, in the reduced game with terminal nodes a and the outcome that would
be reached should he choose a strategy not leading to a, the strategy that leads to a. These
conditions are shown to be not only necessary, but suﬃfient.
9The conditions, which are mediated by existencial quantifiers, amount to a generalization
of the strong axiom of revealed preferences for collective choices.
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to reveal their valuations of it, or consider the cases of a private value auction,
an economy in which externalities arise from the consumption or production of
some commodity, or Bertrand or Cournot oligopolies. In all these cases, the set
of conceivable actions of each player can be taken to be an interval in R.
In that sense, my problem is clearly related to the one studied by Zhou
(1999), and hence their diﬀerences, although simple, deserve to be pointed out.
First, I do not assume that there are only two players. Second, I allow for
constraints on the actions of the players to be exogenously imposed, which was
not the case in Zhou (1999). Third, and most importantly, my requirement
for the individual preferences is weaker that Zhou’s in that I do not rule out
the existence of other equilibria in the constrained games besides the ones that
appear on the observed data set. This diﬀerence is crucial. In my case, the
weaker requirement comes at the cost of needing to impose stronger restrictions
on the class of preferences allowed, in order to rule out trivial results (in which
players do not care about their own actions and, hence, every feasible outcome
is Nash equilibrium) which would immediately render the theory unfalsifiable.
The return for incurring in this cost is that if an empirical application of my
results is to be carried out, there is no need to argue that in the finite data
set one has observed all the equilibria that the game has, which can be a very
strong assumption.10
The assumption of continuous choice sets is an obvious diﬀerence with re-
spect to Sprumont (2000) and Ray and Zhou (2001). Additionally, I impose
weaker observational requirements on my tests than in both of these papers. I
only require that for each observed profile of constraints, a profile of actions be
observed. I do not require (actually, I do rule out) that all possible profiles of
constraints be observed, as is explicitly required by Sprumont, and implicitly
by Ray and Zhou, when they assume that the outcome of all reduced games
is observable. Furthermore, I do not assume that all the equilibria of the con-
strained games have been observed, as explicitly does Sprumont and implicitly
do Ray and Zhou, when they assume uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilib-
ria. In contrast to these two papers, this double nonexhaustiveness may come
as an empirical advantage but, again, it implies my need to rule out triviality
via strong assumptions.
Finally, obvious diﬀerences with the analysis of Ray and Zhou (2001) is that I
study simultaneous-move games and with Chiappori (1988) that my main focus
is noncooperative behavior.
As in the other papers on noncooperative behavior, in particular Zhou (1999)
and Sprumont (2000), I take the principles of Nash behavior in their most salient
instance. That is, I assume that individuals do the best for themselves given
what the others are doing. I am hence subject to the general criticism to the
Nash solution for its strong informational requirement (or extreme accuracy in
10Suppose that one rejects the hypothesis of Nash behavior based on Zhou’s test, using a
finite time series of observations, on the premise that one more equilibrium would need to
exist if all the observed outcomes also are to be equilibria. A “reasonable excuse” would be
that the extra equilibrium just happens to not have been played, with which the empirical
harshness of the test rapidly deteriorates.
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conjecture formation) involved in individual decision-making processes. And in
that sense, this work does not advance the theory started by Bernheim (1984)
and Pearce (1984), where the question of rationalizability of strategic behavior
is answered from the perspective of beliefs and not only of preferences, as I do
here. The criticism is valid, but does not apply as strongly to my results as it
does to general theoretical applications of Nash equilibrium, as will be argued
in subsection 3.3.
3 Noncooperative behavior:
Let I be a nonempty, finite set of players. I will denote by I ∈ N, I > 2, the
number of players. Suppose that for each player i ∈ I, the set of conceivable
actions is the interval Ai = [ai, ai], where ai, ai ∈ R, ai < ai. This set Ai is
player i’s structural choice set, from where he could choose in the absence of
exogenous constraints.11
Given these structural feasible sets, I want to consider the possibility that,
conjunctionally, individuals are constrained in their choices. I model these con-
straints as lower and upper bounds to what they can choose. Besides these
bounds, the only other information that I assume can be observed is actual
individual choices. That is, I assume that a finite sequence is observed, each of
whose elements specifies, for each player, a lower and an upper bound to what
he can choose and an actual choice. Formally:
Definition 1 A data set is a finite sequence³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
such that:
(∀t ∈ {1, ..., T}) (∀i ∈ I) : ¡ai 6 ai,t < ai,t 6 ai ∧ a∗i,t ∈ £ai,t, ai,t¤¢
Hence, for each observation t ∈ {1, ..., T} = T and each player i ∈ I,
one observes three numbers: ai,t and ai,t are, respectively, the minimum and
maximum values that player i can choose at observation t, whereas a∗i,t is what
he actually chose.12 Since one only wants to consider feasible data sets with
meaningful constraints, the conditions that the conjunctional constraint be at
least as tight that the structural one, without implying an empty or degenerate
feasible set and that the actual choice be feasible are imposed by the definition.
My goal here is to derive testable implications on the observed sequence
which are implied by rational behavior in the sense of Nash equilibrium. A
definition of rational data set is then needed. I will say that a data set is,
or, rather, can be rationalized by Nash behavior, if one can find individual
11Like the consumption set in consumer theory.
12Continuing the analogy of footnote 11, the interval
h
ai,t, ai,t
i
is like the budget set in
consumer theory, whereas a∗i,t is analogous to the demand.
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preferences over the collective domain
Q
i∈I Ai, such that for each observation
t ∈ T , the profile of choices ¡a∗i,t¢i∈I is a Nash equilibrium of the game that these
players would play, if they had these preferences and each one were constrained
to choose from the subinterval
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
. Of course, this definition is vacuous,
and Nash behavior unfalsifiable, unless one restricts the class of preferences
allowed in the rationalization. That is, if I allow preferences in which individuals
are indiﬀerent with respect to the value taken by their own choice, then every
individual choice can be a best response, every outcome is therefore a Nash
equilibrium and every data set is rationalizable. I then restrict the class of
preferences, so as to imply that individuals always have unique best responses.
Before the formal definition of rationalizability, the following notational con-
vention has to be introduced: given a player i ∈ I, a function
U i : Ai ×A−i −→ R
where A−i =
Q
j∈I\{i}
Aj , and vectors a0, a0 ∈
Q
j∈I
Aj , a0 ¿ a0, I denote by U ia0,a0
the restriction of U i to
[a0i, a0i]×
Y
j∈I\{i}
£
a0j , a0j
¤
Also, if each player i ∈ I is constrained to choose from a set Bi ⊆ Ai, and has
preferences represented by
V i : Bi ×
Y
j∈I\{i}
Bj −→ R
I denote by N
³¡
Bi, V i
¢
i∈I
´
the set of Nash equilibria of the game
¡
Bi, V i
¢
i∈I .
With this notation, the definition of what data sets will be considered con-
sistent with Nash behavior is:
Definition 2 A data set ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable if for each i ∈ I there exists
U i : Ai ×A−i −→ R
continuous, such that for each a−i ∈ A−i, the function U i (·, a−i) is diﬀeren-
tiable and strongly concave, and for each t ∈ T ,
¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I ∈ N
µ³£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat,at
´
i∈I
¶
In this case, it is said that
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data.
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The assumption that rules out trivial rationalizations is strong concavity in
own actions, since it implies that individual best responses have to be unique,
given the convexity of the constraint sets.13 But I also impose other assump-
tions. Implicitly, I assume that preferences are representable by utility functions
and that these are continuous. Continuity is imposed out of plausibility, in order
to get some smoothness in the best responses of players, in the sense that small
enough changes in actions by other players produce small changes in individual
responses (by the theorem of the maximum). Since general representability re-
sults exist when preferences are continuous (Debreu, 1954) it is reasonable that
these two assumptions come together.14 Neither the assumption of concavity in
own action nor the one of continuity are extraneous to game theory. Concavity
in own actions was used by John von Neumann, in his early contributions to
game theory (see Debreu, 1952), whereas this same condition and continuity
are used in the standard proofs of existence of Nash equilibrium via fixed point
theorems that were inspired by Nash (1950) and Debreu (1952).15 Notice also
that I do not impose any monotonicity requirements. The reason is that im-
posing increasing monotonicity would trivialize the results, as for each player
i ∈ I, a∗i,t = ai,t would be a dominant strategy, while the same would happen,
with a∗i,t = ai,t, if decreasing monotonicity were imposed.
The reason why I choose a weak definition of rationalization, in the sense
that it only requires that for each t ∈ T ,
¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I ∈ N
µ³£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat,at
´
i∈I
¶
and not that
N
µ³£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat,at
´
i∈I
¶
=
n¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I
o
is that I do not want to assume, or imply, that one observes all possible equilibria
of the constrained games. Only one equilibrium is assumed to be observed,
and there is no reason for this equilibrium to be unique. Moreover, under my
assumptions it could very well be the case that for t, t0 ∈ T we have ¡a∗i,t¢i∈I 6=¡
a∗i,t0
¢
i∈I and still ¡
a∗i,t0
¢
i∈I ∈ N
µ³£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat,at
´
i∈I
¶
This is just a property of Nash-equilibrium in this context: suppose that for
13For the purposes of this and the next sections, strong quasiconcavity would suﬃce. Actual
concavity is used only in section 5.1, but the assumption is introduced here for the sake of
consistency.
14 I also assume that these utility functions are diﬀerentiable in own action, but this as-
sumption plays no role in the general result, and we could dispense with it for the purposes
of this section. The assumption will be used in subsection 5.1, when I derive further testable
restrictions under extra assumptions.
15For the Debreu-type existence argument one only requires weak concavity. Zhou (1999)
also requires weak concavity in own action.
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some a0, a0 ∈
Q
i∈I Ai, a0 ¿ a0, and some (a∗i )i∈I ∈
Q
i∈I (a0i, a
0
i), one has that
(a∗i )i∈I ∈ N
µ³
[a0i, a0i] , U ia0,a0
´
i∈I
¶
Then, for all a00, a00 ∈
Q
i∈I Ai, a00 ¿ a00,
(a∗i )i∈I ∈
Y
i∈I
[a00i , a00i ] =⇒ (a∗i )i∈I ∈ N
µ³
[a00i , a00i ] , U ia00,a00
´
i∈I
¶
because
(a∗i )i∈I ∈ N
µ³
[a0i, a0i] , U ia0,a0
´
i∈I
¶
implies that for each i ∈ I, a∗i is a local maximizer of U i
¡·, a∗−i¢ over [a0i, a0i],
and then, since a∗i ∈ (a0i, a0i), it follows from the concavity assumption that a∗i
is global maximizer of U i
¡·, a∗−i¢ over [ai, ai].
Hence, in order to maintain my weak observational requirements, I use a
weak concept of rationalization. This approach is not new, as it is the one
taken, for example, by Brown and Matzkin (1996). There, a finite data set of
prices and endowments is said to be rationalizable if there exist preferences of
the agents such that each observation of prices is a competitive equilibrium price
vector of the exchange economy given the corresponding endowments. It is not
required that such an equilibrium be unique, nor is there a reason to expect
that it will be. I will address this issue again in subsection 3.2.
There are two reasons why I chose to rationalize a finite data set, rather
than some outcome correspondence. (These results must be seen as nonpara-
metric.) One is that finite data sets is what typically one will have available
when trying to apply the results obtained here. The other reason is deeper: since
parametric functions typically are derived from finite data, rejection of the ra-
tionalizability hypothesis could come from either a nonrationalizable data set
or a nonrationalizable functional form applied to probably rationalizable data
(Varian (1983) and Chiappori (1988)). This does not mean that the parametric
approach is not interesting, but rather that its power is fully exploited after a
nonparametric test.
3.1 General testable restrictions:
Following the Popperian postulate, I now study the problem of what conditions
must the observables of the theory satisfy, if one is to say that they are the result
of the behavior assumed by the theory. In other words, if individuals behave
according to the principles behind Nash equilibrium, what are the necessary
conditions (which should not be tautologies,) that have to be exhibited by the
observed data set? Theorem 1 below derives these conditions and shows that
they are all the conditions that can be derived, as they are independent of one
another and also suﬃcient.
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Theorem 1 A data set ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable if, and only if, for all t, t0 ∈ T and all i ∈ I the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. Conditional WARP (CWARP):
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¤
a∗i,t0 ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t = a∗i,t0
2. Conditional Revealed Increasing Monotonicity (CRIM):
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¤
a∗i,t > ai,t0


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
3. Conditional Revealed Decreasing Monotonicity (CRDM):
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¢
a∗i,t 6 ai,t0


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
Proof. Necessity: Let
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalize the data.
Suppose that ∃i ∈ I and ∃t, t0 ∈ T such that a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0 , a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¤
,
a∗i,t0 ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and a∗i,t 6= a∗i,t0 . Without loss of generality, assume that
U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
6 U i
¡
a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t0
¢
. Let ai = 12
¡
a∗i,t + a∗i,t0
¢
. Clearly, ai ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
,
whereas by strong concavity U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
> U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
, contradicting the
fact that
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set. This proves condition (1).
For condition (2), let i ∈ I and t, t0 ∈ T be such that a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0 ,
a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, a∗i,t > ai,t0 . I first claim that ∀a ∈
£
ai, a∗i,t
¢
, U i
¡
a, a∗−i,t
¢
<
U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
. To see this, suppose not: ∃a ∈
£
ai, a∗i,t
¢
: U i
¡
a, a∗−i,t
¢
>
U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
. If a > ai,t, then
1
2
a+ 1
2
a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and
U i
µ
1
2
a+ 1
2
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¶
> 1
2
U i
¡
a, a∗−i,t
¢
+
1
2
U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
> U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
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Hence, it follows from rationalizability that a < ai,t. Let
θ =
a∗i,t − ai,t
2
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢
Clearly, θ ∈ (0, 1) and, therefore, by strong concavity,
U i
¡
θa+ (1− θ) a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
> θU i
¡
a, a∗−i,t
¢
+ (1− θ)U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
> U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
However,
θa+ (1− θ) a∗i,t =
a∗i,t − ai,t
2
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢a+Ã1− a∗i,t − ai,t
2
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢! a∗i,t
=
a∗i,t − ai,t
2
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢a+ a∗i,t − 2a+ ai,t
2
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢ a∗i,t
=
aa∗i,t − aai,t +
¡
a∗i,t
¢2 − 2aa∗i,t + ai,ta∗i,t
2
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢
=
¡
a∗i,t
¢2 − aa∗i,t − aai,t + ai,ta∗i,t
2
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢
=
a∗i,t
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢
+ ai,t
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢
2
¡
a∗i,t − a
¢
=
a∗i,t + ai,t
2
which implies that θa+ (1− θ) a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
. This contradicts the fact that¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set.
I also claim that ∀a, a0 ∈
£
ai, a∗i,t
¤
, such that a < a0, U i
¡
a, a∗−i,t
¢
< U i
¡
a0, a∗−i,t
¢
.
If a0 = a∗i,t, the result follows from the the previous claim. Now, suppose that
a0 < a∗i,t. Let
θ =
a∗i,t − a0
a∗i,t − a
Clearly, θ ∈ (0, 1) and therefore
U i
¡
θa+ (1− θ) a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
> θU i
¡
a, a∗−i,t
¢
+ (1− θ)U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
> U i
¡
a, a∗−i,t
¢
12
where the second inequality also follows from the previous claim. Now,
θa+ (1− θ) a∗i,t =
a∗i,t − a0
a∗i,t − a
a+
Ã
1−
a∗i,t − a0
a∗i,t − a
!
a∗i,t
=
a∗i,t − a0
a∗i,t − a
a+ a
0 − a
a∗i,t − a
a∗i,t
=
aa∗i,t − aa0 + a0a∗i,t − aa∗i,t
a∗i,t − a
= a0
which establishes the claim.
Now, since a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0 , it is clear ∀a, a0 ∈
£
ai, a∗i,t
¤
, such that a < a0,
U i
¡
a, a∗−i,t0
¢
< U i
¡
a0, a∗−i,t0
¢
. Then, since a∗i,t > ai,t0 it follows that ∀a, a0 ∈
[ai, ai,t0 ], such that a < a0, U i
¡
a, a∗−i,t0
¢
< U i
¡
a0, a∗−i,t0
¢
from where, by ratio-
nalizability, a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
Condition (3) can be argued in a similar way.
Suﬃciency: For each i ∈ I, construct T i ⊆ T according to the following
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Input: ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
1. S = T , T i = ∅
2. t = minS
3. Γ =
©
t0 ∈ T | a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t
ª
4. ∆ =
©
t0 ∈ Γ| a∗i,t0 ∈
¡
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¢ª
5. If ∆ 6= ∅, then let τ = min ¡Argmint0∈∆ a∗i,t0¢ and go to 9.
6. Θ =
©
t0 ∈ Γ| a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
ª
7. If Θ 6= ∅, then let τ = min ¡Argmaxt0∈Θ a∗i,t0¢ and go to 9.
8. τ = min
¡
Argmint0∈Γ a∗i,t0
¢
9. T i = T i ∪ {τ}
10. S = S\Γ
11. If S = ∅, stop.
12. Go to 2.
Output: T i ⊆ T
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The output of the algorithm has the following two properties:
(∀t ∈ T ) ¡∃τ ∈ T i¢ : a∗−i,τ = a∗−i,t¡
∀τ , τ 0 ∈ T i : τ 6= τ 0¢ : a∗−i,τ 6= a∗−i,τ 0
which imply that one can construct the following (well-defined) function. Let
φi :
©
a∗−i,t0
ª
t0∈T −→ A
i be defined by
φi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
= a∗i,τt where τ t ∈ T i is such that a∗−i,τt = a∗−i,t
Since
©
a∗−i,t0
ª
t0∈T ⊆ A
−i is closed and φi :
©
a∗−i,t0
ª
t0∈T −→ A
i is continuous
and bounded, by Tietze´s extension theorem (see, for example, theorem 3.12.3
in Bridges, 1988) there exists Φi : A−i −→ Ai, continuous, such that³
∀a−i ∈
©
a∗−i,t0
ª
t0∈T
´
: Φi (a−i) = φi (a−i)
Fix one such Φi : A−i −→ Ai and define U i : Ai ×A−i −→ R as
U i (ai, a−i) = −
¡
ai − Φi (a−i)
¢2
That U i is continuous and ∀a−i ∈ A−i, U i (·, a−i) is diﬀerentiable and
strongly concave is straightforward. Hence, all that remains to show is that¡
U i
¢
i∈I rationalizes the data set:
Let i ∈ I and t ∈ T . Define Γi,t =
©
t0 ∈ T | a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t
ª
. One of the
following three mutually exclusive cases must hold:
Case 1: (∃t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 ∈
¡
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¢
Case 2:
¡
(∀t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0 ∨ a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
∧
¡
(∃t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
Case 3: (∀t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
Suppose that case 1 holds. Let
t0t = min
Ã
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t:a∗i,t0∈(ai,t0 ,ai,t0)
a∗i,t0
!
By construction, a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and
Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
from where, if t0t = t,
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
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Alternatively, suppose that t ∈ T \ {t0t}.
If a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¢
, then by, condition (2), a∗i,t0t < ai,t and a
∗
i,t < ai,t0t ,
whereas, by condition (3), a∗i,t0t > ai,t and a
∗
i,t > ai,t0t . Then, by condition (1),
a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , and, therefore,
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
On the other hand, suppose that a∗i,t = ai,t. If ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t it is obvious that
arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= ai,t
= a∗i,t
whereas if ai,t > a∗i,t0t , there are four possibilities: (i) if ai,t < a
∗
i,t0t
and ai,t0t 6
ai,t, then a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and ai,t0t 6 a
∗
i,t, which implies, by condition (2), that
a∗i,t0t = ai,t0t and contradicts the fact that a
∗
i,t0t
∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
; (ii) If ai,t < a∗i,t0t ,
ai,t0t > ai,t and ai,t0t 6 a
∗
i,t, then a∗i,t0t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and a∗i,t ∈
h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and,
therefore, by condition (1), a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , which implies that
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
(iii) If ai,t < a∗i,t0t , ai,t0t > ai,t and ai,t0t > a
∗
i,t, then
ai,t = a∗i,t
< ai,t0t
< a∗i,t0t
< ai,t
which is an obvious contradiction; (iv) finally, if ai,t > a∗i,t0t , then a
∗
i,t0t
∈h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
and ai,t > a∗i,t0t imply, by condition (3), that a
∗
i,t = ai,t, which
contradicts the fact that a∗i,t = ai,t > ai,t.
Finally, suppose that a∗i,t = ai,t. If a∗i,t0t 6 ai,t it is obvious that
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
whereas if a∗i,t0t > ai,t, there are three possibilities: (i) if ai,t 6 a
∗
i,t0t
, then
a∗i,t0t ∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t imply, by condition (2), that a
∗
i,t = ai,t,
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which contradicts the fact that a∗i,t = ai,t < ai,t, (ii) if ai,t > a∗i,t0t and ai,t0t > a
∗
i,t,
then a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¢
and a∗i,t 6 ai,t0t imply, by condition (3), that a
∗
i,t0t
= ai,t0t ,
which contradicts the fact that a∗i,t0t ∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
; (iii) finally, if ai,t > a∗i,t0t
and ai,t0t < a
∗
i,t, then a∗i,t0t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and a∗i,t ∈
h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and, therefore, by
condition (1), a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , which implies that
a∗i,t = ai,t
< a∗i,t0
= a∗i,t
which is an obvious contradiction.
Suppose now that case 2 holds. Let
t0t = min
Ã
Arg max
t0∈Γi,t:a∗i,t0=ai,t0
a∗i,t0
!
By construction, a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and
Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
from where, if t0t = t,
a∗
i,t, = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Now, suppose that t ∈ T \ {t0t}.
If ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t , then, by condition (3), a
∗
i,t = ai,t, whereas by construction
ai,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Alternatively, ai,t > a∗i,t0t , from where, by construction, a
∗
i,t = ai,t. There are
three possibilities: (i) If ai,t 6 ai,t0t , then, by condition (3), a
∗
i,t0t
= ai,t0t < ai,t0t ,
which is a contradiction, because a∗i,t0t = ai,t0t ; (ii) if ai,t0t < ai,t 6 a
∗
i,t0t
, then
ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t 6 ai,t and ai,t0t < ai,t = a
∗
i,t 6 a∗i,t0t = ai,t0t , which implies, by
condition (1), that a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t and hence that
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
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(iii) if a∗i,t0t < ai,t = a
∗
i,t, then, by construction,
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Finally, suppose that case 3 holds. Let
t0t = min
µ
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t
a∗i,t0
¶
By construction, a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and
Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
Since a∗i,t = ai,t > a∗i,t0t , it follows that
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
The necessity of the conditions of the theorem, and the fact that they are
not tautologies, as it is easy to see that there exist data sets that violate them,
imply that the hypothesis of Nash behavior under the assumptions made here
is falsifiable. It is also easy to see that the conditions are independent of one
another. What is more important is that their suﬃciency implies that the
hypothesis does not have further or stronger testable restrictions.16
The intuition for the conditions of the theorem is simple. CWARP is a
straightforward restatement of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences, for
each i ∈ I and for pairs t, t0 ∈ T such that a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0 :
a∗i,t0 ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
=⇒



a∗i,t = a∗i,t0
or
a∗i,t /∈
£
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¤
Whenever a∗−i is fixed, actions of player i, under the hypothesis of Nash behavior,
ought to maximize a fixed utility function U i
¡·, a∗−i¢ subject to the particular
constraints. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference is a well known necessary
condition for this behavior, as shown in Richter (1966).
The second and third conditions are also straightforward. When player i
chooses a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, over
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, given a∗−i,t, by strong concavity he is
16Let H be a hypothesis and let T be a testable restriction implied by it (that is, H=⇒T,
where T involves only observables of the theory). A stronger testable restriction would be a
condition ST on observables only, such that H=⇒ST, but ¬(T=⇒ST). However, if T=⇒H,
it is clear that stronger testable restrictions cannot exist.
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revealing that U i
¡·, a∗−i,t¢ is strictly increasing on £ai, a∗i,t¤. Hence, conditional
on a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t, if ai,t0 6 a∗i,t, then over
£
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¤
player i ought to choose
a∗i,t0 = ai,t0 , which is CRIM. Similarly, when player i chooses a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¢
,
over
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, given a∗−i,t, by strong concavity he is revealing that U i
¡·, a∗−i,t¢
is strictly decreasing on
£
a∗i,t, ai
¤
. Hence, conditional on a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t, if ai,t0 >
a∗i,t, then over
£
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¤
player i ought to choose a∗i,t0 = ai,t0 . This is CRDM.
There is no immediate analogy between these three conditions and the ones
found in the related literature (see section 2), given that the conditions I have
used are imposed on individual actions, whereas most of the others go via equi-
libria. Under the proviso that the contexts to which they are to apply are
diﬀerent, the “acyclicity” condition of Ray and Zhou (2001) and CWARP here
play the same role: individual choices should be in consistence with the revealed
preference theory, whenever they are made according to the same preferences.
This role is played in Sprumont (2000) by both of his “persistence” conditions,
considering the whole profile of choices (which collect the information on each
individual´s choices and the condition on the actions of their opponents) for
expansions and contractions of the domains. Given the finiteness of his case,
Sprumont does not need to impose further conditions. In Ray and Zhou (2001),
the other two conditions are to ensure subgame perfection, whereas, here, CRIM
and CRDM imply strong concavity. The condition of Zhou (1999), on the other
hand, means to rule out nonobserved outcomes as equilibria, which I do not do.
3.2 Weakness of the rationalization:
Recall that my definition of Nash-rationalizability is weak in the sense that it
only requires that each observed choice be an element of the Nash set of the
corresponding restricted game. As mentioned before, I do not (nor do I want to)
require that the Nash set of the restricted game be the singleton set containing
the observed choice. The risk that I am taking is then that, even though I
have imposed conditions to rule out the result that every possible outcome is a
Nash equilibrium, it could still be the case that almost every possible outcome
is a Nash equilibrium, and with the rationalization of theorem 1 one happens
to, in particular, pick the observed ones. As the following theorem shows, the
conditions of theorem 1 allow for local uniqueness of the observed Nash equilibria
(a property that will be generically shared by the rationalizations of Brown and
Matzkin (1996), mutatis mutandis).
Theorem 2 If a data set ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
satisfies that for every t, t0 ∈ T and every i ∈ Ithe following conditions are
satisfied:
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1. CWARP:
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¤
a∗i,t0 ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t = a∗i,t0
2. CRIM:
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¤
a∗i,t > ai,t0


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
3. CRDM:
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¢
a∗i,t 6 ai,t0


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
then, for each i ∈ I there exists U i : Ai × A−i −→ R, such that ¡U i¢i∈I
Nash-rationalizes the data set with the following property: for each t ∈ T , there
exists an open neighborhood of
¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I, O
³¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I
´
, such that:
N
³¡£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat
¢
i∈I
´
∩O
³¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I
´
=
n¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I
o
Proof. For each i ∈ I, let T i be defined using algorithm 1 and define
εi = min
t,t0∈T i:t6=t0
©°°a∗−i,t − a∗−i,t0°°ª
Since #T i 6 T <∞ and ∀t, t0 ∈ T i, t 6= t0, a∗−i,t 6= a∗−i,t0 , it follows that εi > 0.
Let εi ∈ (0, εi) and define the set
Ci =
Ã [
t∈T i
B εi
2
¡
a∗−i,t
¢!
∩A−i
and the function φi : Ci −→ Ai by
φi (a−i) = min
(
Arg max
ai∈{a∗i,t}t∈T i
µ
min
t0∈T i
³³°°a−i − a∗−i,t0°°− εi2 ´ ¡ai − a∗i,t0¢2´
¶)
I first show that¡
∀t ∈ T i¢ ³∀a−i ∈ B εi
2
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
∩A−i
´
: φi (a−i) = a∗i,t
To see this, let t ∈ T i be fixed and fix a−i in the relevant subset of A−i.
Consider, for each ai ∈
©
a∗i,t00
ª
t00∈T i , the problem
min
t0∈T i
³³°°a−i − a∗−i,t0°°− εi2 ´ ¡ai − a∗i,t0¢2´
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By definition of εi,17 ¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\ {t}¢ : °°a−i − a∗−i,t0°° > εi2
whereas °°a−i − a∗−i,t°° 6 εi2
which suﬃces to imply that
min
t0∈T i
³³°°a−i − a∗−i,t0°°− εi2 ´ ¡ai − a∗i,t0¢2´ = ³°°a−i − a∗−i,t°°− εi2 ´ ¡ai − a∗i,t¢2
and hence that
Arg max
ai∈
n
a∗i,t00
o
t00∈T i
µ
min
t0∈T i
³³°°a−i − a∗−i,t0°°− εi2 ´ ¡ai − a∗i,t0¢2´
¶
=
©
a∗i,t
ª
and that φi (a−i) = a∗i,t.
Also, notice that ∀t, t0 ∈ T i, t 6= t0,
B εi
2
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
∩B εi
2
³
a∗−i,t0
´
= ∅
from where it follows that φi is continuous. Since this function is also bounded,
then, by Tietze’s extension theorem, there exists Φi : A−i −→ Ai, continuous,
such that ¡
∀a−i ∈ Ci
¢
: Φi (a−i) = φi (a−i)
Define now U i : Ai ×A−i −→ R by
U i (ai, a−i) = −
¡
ai − Φi (a−i)
¢2
Clearly, U i is continuous.
I now have to show that, so defined,
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set.
It is immediate that ∀a−i ∈ A−i, the function U i (·, a−i) is diﬀerentiable and
strongly concave. In order to show that
(∀t ∈ T ) : ¡a∗i,t¢i∈I ∈ N ³¡£ai,t, ai,t¤ , U iat¢i∈I´
17This follows by triangle inequality: if for some t0 ∈ T i\ {t},
°°°a−i − a∗−i,t0°°° 6 εi2 , then°°°a∗−i,t − a∗−i,t0°°° = °°°a∗−i,t − ai + ai − a∗−i,t0°°°
6
°°a∗−i,t − ai°° + °°°ai − a∗−i,t0°°°
6 εi
2
+
εi
2
= εi
< εi
a contradiction.
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let i ∈ I and t ∈ T and define Γi,t =
©
t0 ∈ T | a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t
ª
. As before, one of
the following three mutually exclusive cases must hold:
Case 1: (∃t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 ∈
¡
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¢
Case 2:
¡
(∀t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0 ∨ a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
∧
¡
(∃0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
Case 3: (∀t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
Suppose that case 1 holds. Let
t0t = min
Ã
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t:a∗i,t0∈(ai,t0 ,ai,t0)
a∗i,t0
!
By construction, t0t ∈ T i, a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and, therefore
Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
from where, if t0t = t,
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Alternatively, suppose that t ∈ T \ {t0t}.
If a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¢
, then by, condition (2), a∗i,t0t < ai,t and a
∗
i,t < ai,t0t ,
whereas, by condition (3), a∗i,t0t > ai,t and a
∗
i,t > ai,t0t . Then, by condition (1),
a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , and, therefore,
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
On the other hand, suppose that a∗i,t = ai,t. If ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t it is obvious that
arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= ai,t
= a∗i,t
whereas if ai,t > a∗i,t0t , there are four possibilities: (i) if ai,t < a
∗
i,t0t
and ai,t0t 6
ai,t, then a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and ai,t0t 6 a
∗
i,t, which implies, by condition (2), that
a∗i,t0t = ai,t0t and contradicts the fact that a
∗
i,t0t
∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
; (ii) If ai,t < a∗i,t0t ,
ai,t0t > ai,t and ai,t0t 6 a
∗
i,t, then a∗i,t0t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and a∗i,t ∈
h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and,
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therefore, by condition (1), a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , which implies that
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
(iii) If ai,t < a∗i,t0t , ai,t0t > ai,t and ai,t0t > a
∗
i,t, then
ai,t = a∗i,t
< ai,t0t
< a∗i,t0t
< ai,t
which is an obvious contradiction; (iv) finally, if ai,t > a∗i,t0t , then a
∗
i,t0t
∈h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
and ai,t > a∗i,t0t imply by condition (3) that a
∗
i,t = ai,t, which con-
tradicts the fact that a∗i,t = ai,t > ai,t.
Finally, suppose that a∗i,t = ai,t. If a∗i,t0t 6 ai,t it is obvious that
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
whereas if a∗i,t0t > ai,t, there are three possibilities: (i) if ai,t 6 a
∗
i,t0t
, then
a∗i,t0t ∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t imply, by condition (2), that a
∗
i,t = ai,t,
which contradicts the fact that a∗i,t = ai,t < ai,t, (ii) if ai,t > a∗i,t0t and ai,t0t > a
∗
i,t,
then a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¢
and a∗i,t 6 ai,t0t imply, by condition (3), that a
∗
i,t0t
= ai,t0t ,
which contradicts the fact that a∗i,t0t ∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
; (iii) finally, if ai,t > a∗i,t0t
and ai,t0t < a
∗
i,t, then a∗i,t0t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and a∗i,t ∈
h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and, therefore, by
condition (1), a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , which implies that
a∗i,t = ai,t
< a∗i,t0
= a∗i,t
which is an obvious contradiction.
Suppose now that case 2 holds. Let
t0t = min
Ã
Arg max
t0∈Γi,t:a∗i,t0=ai,t0
a∗i,t0
!
By construction, t0t ∈ T i, a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and, therefore,
Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
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from where, if t0t = t,
a∗
i,t, = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Now, suppose that t ∈ T \ {t0t}.
If ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t , then, by condition (3), a
∗
i,t = ai,t, whereas by construction
ai,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Alternatively, ai,t > a∗i,t0t , from where, by construction, a
∗
i,t = ai,t. There are
three possibilities: (i) If ai,t 6 ai,t0t , then, by condition (3), a
∗
i,t0t
= ai,t0t < ai,t0t ,
which is a contradiction, because a∗i,t0t = ai,t0t ; (ii) if ai,t0t < ai,t 6 a
∗
i,t0t
, then
ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t 6 ai,t and ai,t0t < ai,t = a
∗
i,t 6 a∗i,t0t = ai,t0t , which implies, by
condition (1), that a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t and hence that
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
(iii) if a∗i,t0t < ai,t = a
∗
i,t, then, by construction,
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Finally, suppose that case 3 holds. Let
t0t = min
µ
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t
a∗i,t0
¶
By construction, t0t ∈ T i, a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and, therefore
Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
Since a∗i,t = ai,t > a∗i,t0t , it follows that
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
This implies that
(∀t ∈ T ) : ¡a∗i,t¢i∈I ∈ N ³¡£ai,t, ai,t¤ , U iat¢i∈I´
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Let
ε = min
i∈I
εi
Since I <∞, it follows that ε > 0. Define for each t ∈ T
O
³¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I
´
= B ε
2
³¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I
´
Let t ∈ T . All that remains to be shown now is that if
(ai)i∈I ∈
Ã
O
³¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I
´
∩
Y
i∈I
Ai
!-n¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I
o
then
(ai)i∈I /∈ N
³¡£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat
¢
i∈I
´
To see this, notice that if (ai)i∈I 6=
¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I , then for some i ∈ I, ai 6= a∗i,t.
Fix one such i. By construction,°°°(aj)j∈I − ¡a∗j,t¢j∈I°°° < ε2 6 εi2
so that °°a−i − a∗−i,t°° < εi2
Consider first the case t ∈ T i. Clearly,18¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\ {t}¢ : °°a−i − a∗−i,t0°° > εi2
which suﬃces to imply that
min
t0∈T i
³³°°a−i − a∗−i,t0°°− εi2 ´ ¡ai − a∗i,t0¢2´ = ³°°a−i − a∗−i,t°°− εi2 ´ ¡ai − a∗i,t¢2
and, since a−i ∈ B εi
2
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
, that Φi (a−i) = φi (a−i) = a∗i,t and hence that
U i (ai, a−i) = −
¡
ai − a∗i,t
¢2
< 0
= −
¡
a∗i,t − a∗i,t
¢2
= U i
¡
a∗i,t, a−i
¢
so that
ai /∈ Arg maxbai∈[ai,t,ai,t]U
i (bai, a−i)
and
(ai)i∈I /∈ N
³¡£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat
¢
i∈I
´
18 See footnote 17.
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If, on the other hand, t ∈ T \T i, then, as before, if Γi,t =
©
t0 ∈ T | a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t
ª
,
one of the following cases holds:
Case 1: (∃t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 ∈
¡
ai,t0 , ai,t0
¢
Case 2:
¡
(∀t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0 ∨ a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
∧
¡
(∃0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
Case 3: (∀t0 ∈ Γi,t) : a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
Suppose that case 1 holds. Let
t0t = min
Ã
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t:a∗i,t0∈(ai,t0 ,ai,t0)
a∗i,t0
!
By construction, t0t ∈ T , a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and, since a−i ∈ B εi2
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
Φi
¡
a∗−i
¢
= Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
If a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¢
, then by, condition (2), a∗i,t0t < ai,t and a
∗
i,t < ai,t0t ,
whereas, by condition (3), a∗i,t0t > ai,t and a
∗
i,t > ai,t0t . Then, by condition (1),
a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , and, therefore,
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
On the other hand, suppose that a∗i,t = ai,t. If ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t it is obvious that
arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= ai,t
= a∗i,t
whereas if ai,t > a∗i,t0t , there are four possibilities: (i) if ai,t < a
∗
i,t0t
and ai,t0t 6
ai,t, then a∗i,t ∈
¡
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and ai,t0t 6 a
∗
i,t, which implies, by condition (2), that
a∗i,t0t = ai,t0t and contradicts the fact that a
∗
i,t0t
∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
; (ii) If ai,t < a∗i,t0t ,
ai,t0t > ai,t and ai,t0t 6 a
∗
i,t, then a∗i,t0t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and a∗i,t ∈
h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and,
therefore, by condition (1), a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , which implies that
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
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(iii) If ai,t < a∗i,t0t , ai,t0t > ai,t and ai,t0t > a
∗
i,t, then
ai,t = a∗i,t
< ai,t0t
< a∗i,t0t
< ai,t
which is an obvious contradiction; (iv) finally, if ai,t > a∗i,t0t , then a
∗
i,t0t
∈h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
and ai,t > a∗i,t0t imply by condition (3) that a
∗
i,t = ai,t, which con-
tradicts the fact that a∗i,t = ai,t > ai,t.
Finally, suppose that a∗i,t = ai,t. If a∗i,t0t 6 ai,t it is obvious that
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
whereas if a∗i,t0t > ai,t, there are three possibilities: (i) if ai,t 6 a
∗
i,t0t
, then
a∗i,t0t ∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t imply, by condition (2), that a
∗
i,t = ai,t,
which contradicts the fact that a∗i,t = ai,t < ai,t, (ii) if ai,t > a∗i,t0t and ai,t0t > a
∗
i,t,
then a∗i,t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¢
and a∗i,t 6 ai,t0t imply, by condition (3), that a
∗
i,t0t
= ai,t0t ,
which contradicts the fact that a∗i,t0t ∈
³
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
´
; (iii) finally, if ai,t > a∗i,t0t
and ai,t0t < a
∗
i,t, then a∗i,t0t ∈
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
and a∗i,t ∈
h
ai,t0t , ai,t0t
i
and, therefore, by
condition (1), a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t , which implies that
a∗i,t = ai,t
< a∗i,t0
= a∗i,t
which is an obvious contradiction.
At any rate, it follows that
ai /∈ Arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Suppose now that case 2 holds. Let
t0t = min
Ã
Arg max
t0∈Γi,t:a∗i,t0=ai,t0
a∗i,t0
!
By construction, t0t ∈ T , a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and, since a−i ∈ B εi2
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
Φi (a−i) = Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
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If ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t , then, by condition (3), a
∗
i,t = ai,t, whereas by construction
ai,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Alternatively, ai,t > a∗i,t0t , from where, by construction, a
∗
i,t = ai,t. There are
three possibilities: (i) If ai,t 6 ai,t0t , then, by condition (3), a
∗
i,t0t
= ai,t0t < ai,t0t ,
which is a contradiction; (ii) if ai,t0t < ai,t 6 a
∗
i,t0t
, then ai,t 6 a∗i,t0t 6 ai,t and
ai,t0t < ai,t = a
∗
i,t 6 a∗i,t0t = ai,t0t , which implies, by condition (1), that a
∗
i,t = a∗i,t0t
and hence that
a∗i,t = arg maxai∈Ai
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
= arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
(iii) if a∗i,t0t < ai,t = a
∗
i,t, then, by construction,
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
At any rate,
a−i /∈ Arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
Finally, suppose that case 3 holds. Let
t0t = min
µ
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t
a∗i,t0
¶
By construction, t0t ∈ T , a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t and, since a−i ∈ B εi2
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
Φi
¡
a∗−i
¢
= Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= a∗i,t0t
Since a∗i,t = ai,t > a∗i,t0t , it follows that
a∗i,t = arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
and, therefore
a−i /∈ Arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai,a∗−i,t
¢
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It follows directly from theorem 1 that the conditions of theorem 2 are also
necessary for this stronger version of rationalizability that requires local unique-
ness. What theorem 2 implies, then, is that, from an empirical perspective, these
two versions of the Nash-behavior hypothesis are indistinguishable. Put another
way, in the context assumed here, the hypothesis of determinacy of Nash equi-
libria is unfalsifiable: given a data set that is Nash-rationalizable, one can never
rule out the possibility that the observed equilibria are locally unique.
3.3 Harshness of the restrictions:
Following the Popperian method, the derivation of the testable implications of
a theory ought to be followed by an assessment of how harsh these implications
are. A harsh test is one that the researcher, before observing the data, would
expect the theory to fail. Simple observation of the conditions of theorem 1
reveals that they are extremely mild. The three of them apply, individual-wise
and for pairs of observations, conditionally on all the other players keeping their
actions unchanged. Now, suppose that there are two players who choose their
actions a∗i randomly, uniformly over
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, which is never a singleton set.
In this case, the probability that for some i ∈ I, there exist t, t0 ∈ T such that
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0 is zero. With all likelihood, one should expect the hypothesis of
Nash behavior to pass the test of theorem 1, notwithstanding the fact that it is
false.
Formally, this comes from the following straightforward corollary of theorem
1:
Corollary 1 Given a data set³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
if for each t, t0 ∈ T such that t 6= t0, there exist i0, i00 ∈ I such that
i0 6= i00
a∗i0,t 6= a∗i0,t0
a∗i00,t 6= a∗i00,t0
then, the data set is Nash-rationalizable.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I and t, t0 ∈ T . Since ∃i0, i00 ∈ I such that
i0 6= i00
a∗i0,t 6= a∗i0,t0
a∗i00,t 6= a∗i00,t0
then a∗−i,t 6= a∗−i,t0 . Since this is true ∀i ∈ I and ∀t, t0 ∈ T , then, by theorem 1,
the data set is Nash-rationalizable.
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The power of the test derived from theorem 1 is thus nil: if one randomly
generates a data set using nonatomic measures, such as uniform distributions,
and since ai < ai, then the probability of obtaining a data set for which one
can refute the null hypothesis that it is derived from Nash equilibria is zero, in
spite of its falsehood.
In an informal sense, the implication of this corollary is that the restrictions
of theorem 1 have “zero measure” and hence, even before observing any data,
researchers should expect the test to be passed. Given this result, the suﬃ-
ciency of the conditions of theorem 1 becomes crucial: even an exhaustive list
of empirical restrictions of Nash behavior fails to constitute a harsh test of its
principles. Moreover, it follows from theorem 2, that requiring local uniqueness
of equilibria will not change this conclusion.
It is in this sense that I sustained in section 2 that the criticism of the
Nash solution for its extreme informational assumptions appears less severe
in this context. Even under the strong presumption that each player foresees
the actions of his opponents with perfect accuracy, one will almost always fail
to reject the hypothesis of Nash behavior. From an empirical point of view,
one could almost never reject such hypothesis of perfect accuracy. Hence, only
upon rejection of the hypothesis would one need to explore explanations of the
observed behavior based on beliefs, and not only on preferences.
4 Cooperative behavior:
Another point of the Popperian postulate is the comparison of theories with dis-
tinguished alternative theories, in order to asses their relative predictive abilities.
The most prominent alternative behavioral assumption is that of cooperative
behavior by agents, which in its most basic form would assume that individuals
cooperate so as to obtain Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes. I now study the testable
implications of the Pareto solution in the context developed in the previous
section.
As in noncooperative behavior, I want to study conditions under which
the observed data set may be the result of cooperative behavior, in which
for each observation t ∈ T agents jointly choose a Pareto-eﬃcient outcome,¡
a∗i,t
¢
i∈I , according to their preferences, from the collectively feasible domainQ
i∈I
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
. I again propose a weak definition of rationalizability, which
requires that each observed outcome be Pareto-eﬃcient, but does not impose
that it be the only Pareto-eﬃcient outcome, nor does it presume that all the
Pareto sets of the observed feasible sets have been captured by the finite data
set. The risk of trivial results arises again: if individuals are indiﬀerent between
all outcomes of the games, or if one can assume that there exists at least two
players who are global antagonists, in the sense that for any domain an im-
provement for one of them means that the other one is worse oﬀ, then any data
set is rationalizable. Once again, these possibilities are excluded via a concavity
assumption that restricts the class of preferences allowed in the rationalizations.
Before the actual definition of Pareto-rationalizability, the following notation
29
needs to be introduced: given a set I of players, each of whom has a set Bi of
feasible actions and preferences represented by
V i :
Y
j∈I
Bj −→ R
let P
³¡
Bi, V i
¢
i∈I
´
represent the set of Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes of the game¡
Bi, V i
¢
i∈I .
With this, the data sets that are considered consistent with cooperative
behavior are defined as follows:
Definition 3 A data set ³¡
ai,t, ai,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is (nontrivially, weakly) Pareto-rationalizable if for each i ∈ I there exists U i :Q
j∈I
Aj −→ R, diﬀerentiable and strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T ) : (ai,t)i∈I ∈ P
µ³£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat,at
´
i∈I
¶
In this case, it is said that
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Pareto-rationalizes the data.
For notational simplicity, throughout this section I do not distinguish the
actions of each agent from those of his opponents. The obvious reason is that
in the case of Pareto-eﬃcient decisions, all variables are treated equivalently by
the players (the ordinal eﬀect of a−i on U i does matter). What is conceptu-
ally important is that for this same reason I am restricting the class of utility
functions allowed for rationalization to a strict subset of the class allowed for
noncooperative behavior, which only required strong concavity with respect to
own actions. In that sense, I am using a stronger criterion of rationalizability
for the hypothesis of cooperation. However, as the following results show, not
even under this stronger criterion is cooperative behavior falsifiable.
In the following result, I ignore conjunctional constraints, and study the
Pareto set over the whole collective domain.
Theorem 3 For any finite subset {at}Tt=1 of
Q
i∈I
Ai, there exists
¡
U i
¢
i∈I such
that for each i ∈ I, U i : Q
j∈I
Aj −→ R is diﬀerentiable and strongly concave, and
{at}Tt=1 ⊆ P
³¡
Ai, U i
¢
i∈I
´
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that for each i ∈ I, ai = 0 (and
ai > 0). It follows from lemma 1 in appendix 7 that there exists v ∈ RI++ such
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that for each t, t0 ∈ T , t 6= t0, it is true that v · at 6= v · at0 . Fix one such v ∈ RI
and define, for each t ∈ T , Vt = v · at. Clearly,
(∀t, t0 ∈ T ) : t 6= t0 =⇒ Vt 6= Vt0
Consider the sequence (at, v)Tt=1. I now show that this sequence satisfies
condition 3 (see appendix 8.) Let N 6 T and {τ1, ..., τN} ⊆ T . Suppose
that ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}
v · ¡aτn+1 − aτn¢ 6 0
Then, by transitivity
VτN 6 Vτ1
and, since ∀t, t0 ∈ T : t 6= t0 =⇒ Vt 6= Vt0 , we have that if aτN 6= aτ1 , then
VτN < Vτ1
which implies that
v · (aτN − aτ1) < 0
which implies that condition 2 is satisfied. In this case, condition 3 is immediate.
Since v ∈ RI++, by theorem 6 in appendix 8, there exists a function V + :Q
i∈I
Ai −→ R, continuously diﬀerentiable and strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: V + (a) > V + (at) =⇒ v · a > v · at
and,
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: v · a < v · at =⇒ V + (a) < V + (at)
On the other hand, consider the sequence
¡
a− at, v
¢T
t=1, where a =
¡
ai
¢
i∈I .
I now show that this sequence also satisfies condition 3. As before, let N 6 T
and {τ1, ..., τN} ⊆ T . Suppose that ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}
v · ¡¡a− aτn+1¢− ¡a− aτn¢¢ 6 0
Then, ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}
v · ¡aτn+1 − aτn¢ > 0
and, by transitivity,
VτN > Vτ1
Hence, since ∀t, t0 ∈ T : t 6= t0 =⇒ Vt 6= Vt0 , we have that if aτN 6= aτ1 , then
VτN > Vτ1
which implies that
v · (aτN − aτ1) > 0
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and that
v · ¡¡a− aτN ¢− ¡a− aτ1¢¢ < 0
which implies that condition 2 is satisfied. Again, condition 3 is here immediate.
Since v ∈ RI++, it follows once again from theorem 6, that there exists a
function V − :
Q
i∈I
Ai −→ R, diﬀerentiable and strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: V − (a) > V −
¡
a− at
¢
=⇒ v · a > v · ¡a− at¢
and
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: v · a < v · ¡a− at¢ =⇒ V − (a) < V − ¡a− at¢
Now, since I > 2, it follows that I\ {I} 6= ∅ and, then, for each i ∈ I\ {I},
one can define U i :
Q
i∈I
Ai −→ R, as U i (a) = V + (a), and define UI :
Q
i∈I
Ai −→
R, as UI (a) = V −
¡
a− a
¢
. That ∀i ∈ I {I}, U i is diﬀerentiable and strongly
concave is obvious, whereas UI is diﬀerentiable since so are V − and the mapping
a 7−→ a− a, and is strongly concave since so is V − while a 7−→ a− a is aﬃne.
I finally show that
{at}Tt=1 ⊆ P
³¡
Ai, U i
¢
i∈I
´
Fix t ∈ T . Suppose that a ∈ Q
i∈I
Ai is such that for i ∈ I\ {I} we have
U i (a) > U i (at). Then V + (a) > V + (at), so that v · a > v · at and, therefore,
v · ¡a− a¢ < v · ¡a− at¢, so that V − ¡a− a¢ < V − ¡a− at¢ and UI (a) <
U I (at). If, on the other hand a ∈
Q
i∈I
Ai satisfies that U I (a) > U I (at), then
V −
¡
a− a
¢
> V −
¡
a− at
¢
, so that v · ¡a− a¢ > v · ¡a− at¢ and, therefore,
v · a < v · at, from where V + (a) < V + (at), implying that for all i ∈ I\ {I},
U i (a) < U i (at).
What the previous proof does is to make player I antagonist to all the rest of
the players at each at. This does not trivialize the result, because the antagonism
does not occur globally, but only locally: global antagonists could not all have
strongly concave utility functions.19 The theorem applies more generally than
the present context, as it holds for any number of players (greater than or equal
to two) and any number of dimensions in the collective domain (that is, it does
not require that the number of players and the number of dimensions be the
same).
In the case dealt with here, where there may be constraints to choice, the
implication is that the hypothesis of Pareto behavior is unfalsifiable, as implied
by the following corollary:
19Of course, I could not have made the argument if I were also requiring monotonicity.
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Corollary 2 Any data set ³¡
ai,t, ai,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Pareto-rationalizable.
Proof. By theorem 3, for each i ∈ I there exists, U i : Q
j∈I
Aj −→ R diﬀeren-
tiable and strongly concave, such that
T[
t=1
{at} ⊆ P
³¡
Ai, U i
¢
i∈I
´
Fix t ∈ T . Then,
at ∈ P
³¡
Ai, U i
¢
i∈I
´
⊆ P
µ³£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
, U iat,at
´
i∈I
¶
because
at ∈
Y
i∈I
£
ai,t, ai,t
¤
⊆
Y
i∈I
Ai
This result is interesting by itself, since it implies the unfalsifiability of a
noticeable behavioral hypothesis in economics and in game theory.20 Regarding
the main focus of this paper, its implication is that the empirical restrictions
of Nash behavior derived in section 3 are weak in yet another sense: not only
are they extremely mild, but, also, they are weak in that whenever a data set
passes the test, there is no way to rule out the possibility that it is coming
from a totally diﬀerent behavior by agents, namely that they are cooperating
to obtain Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes.
5 Further and stronger restrictions under non-
cooperative behavior:
In view of the results of section 3, regarding the lack of predictive power of
the Nash hypothesis, I now study whether further assumptions yield further or
stronger testable restrictions.
20The result stands in contrast with the one in Chiappori (1988). As I have pointed out,
however, Chiappori requires monotonicity in the utility functions, and has feasible sets in
which there is trade-oﬀ between the player’s actions. Because the context here does not have
the second property, and because in its absence imposing monotonicity would trivialize the
Nash-rationalizability problem, I have chosen not to impose any monotonicity requirement.
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Specifically, a reasonable criticism to the results of section 3 is that my
definition of Nash-rationalizability imposes little structure regarding how a−i
enters U i (only continuity) and that, therefore, in many specific cases such
definition is inappropriate in the sense that the class of utility functions that it
allows is too large. The reason why such a large class of preferences was used in
section 3 is that it covers a large class of games. If one has theoretical reasons
to impose other assumptions that reduce the class of preferences to be allowed,
the question then arises of whether the restrictions of theorem 1 (or 2), which
will of course remain necessary under subclasses of the original class, are all the
restrictions of the theory. I now explore possible cases when, indeed, further
and stronger testable implications exist.
For the sake of simplicity, I henceforth assume that the following condition
holds:
Condition 1 For each i ∈ I and each t ∈ T , ai = ai,t = 0.
Under this assumption, one can redefine a data set as:
Definition 4 A data set is a finite sequence³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
such that:
(∀t ∈ T ) (∀i ∈ I) : ¡0 < ai,t 6 ai ∧ a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t]¢
And then, the following corollary to theorem 1 is straightforward:
Corollary 3 A data set ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable if, and only if, for all t, t0 ∈ T and all i ∈ I the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. CWARP:
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t = a∗i,t0
2. CRIM:
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t /∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
¾
=⇒ a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
Proof. It suﬃces to show that conditions (1) and (2) here are equivalent to
the restrictions of theorem 1, which, under condition 1, become: ∀t, t0 ∈ T and
∀i ∈ I:
(i):
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t = a∗i,t0
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(ii):
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈ (0, ai,t]
a∗i,t > ai,t0


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
(iii):
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t = 0
¾
=⇒ a∗i,t0 = 0
Hence, suppose first that condition (1) and (2) here are satisfied. Condition
(i) is immediate from 1.
For condition (ii), suppose that for some t, t0 ∈ T and some i ∈ I: a∗−i,t =
a∗−i,t0 , a∗i,t ∈ (0, ai,t] and a∗i,t > ai,t0 . If a∗i,t > ai,t0 , then, by condition (2),
a∗i,t0 = ai,t0 . Else, a∗i,t = ai,t0 , which implies that a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]. If a∗i,t0 > ai,t,
then
ai,t0 = a∗i,t
6 ai,t
< a∗i,t0
6 ai,t0
an obvious contradiction. Hence, it must be that a∗i,t0 6 ai,t, in which case
a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t] and, therefore, by condition (1),
a∗i,t0 = a∗i,t
= ai,t0
For condition (iii), suppose that for some t, t0 ∈ T and some i ∈ I: a∗−i,t =
a∗−i,t0 and a∗i,t = 0. If a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t], then, by condition (1), a∗i,t0 = 0. Else,
a∗i,t0 > ai,t, which implies, by condition (2), that a∗i,t = ai,t > 0, which is a
contradiction.
Now, suppose that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. Condition (1) is
immediate from (i).
For condition (2), suppose that for some t, t0 ∈ T and some i ∈ I, a∗−i,t =
a∗−i,t0 , a∗i,t /∈ [0, ai,t0 ]. Then, a∗i,t > ai,t0 > 0, which implies that a∗i,t ∈ (0, ai,t]
and a∗i,t > ai,t0 , and, therefore, by condition (ii) a∗i,t0 = ai,t0 .
Again, CWARP is a restatement of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Prefer-
ences,21 which must hold for each individual, conditional on the other players
keeping their actions and, therefore, the preferences of the particular individual
unchanged. CRIM must still hold under Nash-rationalizability, but CRDM need
no longer be observed given the assumption of condition 1.
5.1 Further testable restrictions:
As a first direction to reduce the class of preferences allowed by the definitions of
Nash-rationalizability, one may want to restrict the specific way in which actions
21Which in this case suﬃces for the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences.
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by others aﬀect individual best responses. Specifically, for the purposes of this
subsection, suppose that there are only two players, so that I = {1, 2}. Under
some preferences for player i ∈ I, actions by his opponent, j, are complementary
(to his own) if whenever j increases the value of his choice, the marginal utility
that i derives from his own action increases. If, on the contrary, this marginal
utility decreases, then the actions of player j are substitutes for those of i, from
the point of view of i.
Formally, suppose that for player i ∈ I, U i : Ai × A−i −→ R satisfies that
for each a−i ∈ A−i, U (·, a−i) is diﬀerentiable. Then,
Definition 5 For i ∈ I, a utility function U i : Ai × A−i −→ R is said to
exhibit strategic complementarity on S ⊆ A−i, where S is an interval, if for all
a−i, a0−i ∈ S,
a−i 6 a0−i =⇒
¡
∀ai ∈ Ai
¢
:
∂U i
∂ai
(ai, a−i) 6
∂U i
∂ai
¡
ai, a0−i
¢
Definition 6 For i ∈ I, a utility function U i : Ai × A−i −→ R is said to
exhibit strategic substitutability on S ⊆ A−i, where S is an interval, if for all
a−i, a0−i ∈ S,
a−i 6 a0−i =⇒
¡
∀ai ∈ Ai
¢
:
∂U i
∂ai
(ai, a−i) >
∂U i
∂ai
¡
ai, a0−i
¢
Suppose also that one has a priori theoretical knowledge to imply, for ex-
ample, that for each player the actions of his opponent are complementary on
[0,ea−i] ⊆ £0, a−i¤, and substitute on £ea−i, a−i¤. Then, besides the restrictions
of corollary 3, these two new hypotheses can be tested, and all the restrictions
of Nash behavior in this new context are implied by the following result:
Theorem 4 For each i ∈ I, let eai ∈ Ai be given. Let the data set³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
be given. There exists
¡
U i
¢
i∈I that Nash-rationalizes the data set, such that
for each i ∈ I, U i exhibits strategic complementarity on [0,ea−i] and strategic
substitutability on
£ea−i, a−i¤ if, and only if, for each t, t0 ∈ T and each i ∈ I
the following conditions are satisfied:
1. CWARP:
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t = a∗i,t0
2. CRIM:
a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t /∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
¾
=⇒ a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
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3. Revealed Strategic Complementarity (RSC):
a∗−i,t ∈ [0,ea−i]
a∗−i,t0 6 a∗−i,t
¾
=⇒ a∗i,t ∈
£
min
©
ai,t, a∗i,t0
ª
, ai,t
¤
4. Revealed Strategic Substitutability (RSS):
a∗−i,t ∈
£ea−i, a−i¤
a∗−i,t0 > a∗−i,t
¾
=⇒ a∗i,t ∈
£
min
©
ai,t, a∗i,t0
ª
, ai,t
¤
Proof. Necessity: Fix i ∈ I. That conditions (1) and (2) are necessary
follows from corollary 3. For condition (3), suppose that for some t, t0 ∈ T we
have that a∗−i,t ∈ [0,ea−i] and a∗i,t0 6 a∗−i,t, yet a∗i,t < min©ai,t, a∗i,t0ª. By Nash
rationalizability,
a∗i,t ∈ Arg maxai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
and then, by the Kühn-Tucker theorem, since a∗i,t < ai,t, it must be true that
∂U i
∂ai
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
6 0
Now, since U i exhibits strategic complementarity on [0,ea−i] and a∗−i,t0 6 a∗−i,t 6ea−i,
∂U i
∂ai
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t0
¢
6 0
and, since U i
¡·, a∗−i,t0¢ is strongly concave and a∗i,t < a∗i,t0 , it follows that
∂U i
∂ai
¡
a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t0
¢
< 0
which implies, again by the Kühn-Tucker theorem, and since
a∗i,t0 ∈ Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t0 ]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t0
¢
that a∗i,t0 = 0, and hence that
£
0, a∗i,t0
¢
= ∅, contradicting the assumption that
a∗i,t ∈
£
0,min
©
ai,t, a∗i,t0
ª¢
⊆
£
0, a∗i,t0
¢
Similarly for condition (4). Suppose that for some t, t0 ∈ T we have that
a∗−i,t ∈
£ea−i, a−i¤ and a∗−i,t0 > a∗−i,t, yet a∗i,t < min©ai,t, a∗i,t0ª. By Nash
rationalizability,
a∗i,t ∈ Arg maxai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
and then, by the Kühn-Tucker theorem, since a∗i,t < ai,t, it must be true that
∂U i
∂ai
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
6 0
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and then, since U i exhibits strategic substitutability on
£ea−i, a−i¤ and a∗i,t0 >
a∗−i,t > ea−i,
∂U i
∂ai
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t0
¢
6 0
and, since U i
¡·, a∗−i,t0¢ is strongly concave and a∗i,t < a∗i,t0 ,
∂U i
∂ai
¡
a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t0
¢
< 0
which implies, again by the Kühn-Tucker theorem, and since
a∗i,t0 ∈ Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t0 ]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t0
¢
that a∗i,t0 = 0, and hence that
£
0, a∗i,t0
¢
= ∅, contradicting the assumption that
a∗i,t ∈
£
0,min
©
ai,t, a∗i,t0
ª¢
⊆
£
0, a∗i,t0
¢
Suﬃciency: Fix i ∈ I. Construct T i as follows:
• τ i1 = {1}
• For t ∈ {2, ..., T} ,
τ it =



∅ if (∃t0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}) :



a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0
a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]
{t} otherwise
• T i0 =
TS
t=1
τ it
• T i1 =
©
t ∈ T i0
¯¯ ¡
∃t0 ∈ T i0 \ {t}
¢
: a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t
ª
• T i2 =
©
t ∈ T i1
¯¯ ¡
∀t0 ∈ T i1 : a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t
¢
: ai,t0 6 ai,t
ª
• T i = ¡T i0 \T i1 ¢ ∪ T i2
It follows by construction that if t ∈ T i0 \T i1 , then¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\ {t}¢ : a∗−i,t0 6= a∗−i,t
since T i ⊆ T i0 . Moreover, if t, t0 ∈ T i2 , t 6= t0, and a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0 , then, by
definition, a−i,t = a−i,t0 , which implies that a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ] and a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t].
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But this is impossible since, assuming without loss of generality that t < t0,
then τ it0 = ∅ and t0 /∈ T i0 .22 Therefore,¡
∀t, t0 ∈ T i : t 6= t0¢ : a∗−i,t 6= a∗−i,t0
Reorder T i as ©
ti1, ti2, ..., tiT i
ª
where T i = #T i, so that¡
∀n ∈
©
1, ..., T i − 1
ª¢
: a∗−i,tin < a
∗
−i,tin+1
I will consider only the case when a∗−i,ti1 6 ea−i 6 a∗−i,tiTi , since the other cases
derive easily from this one. Construct the mapping
ϑi :


T i[
n=1
n
a∗−i,tin
o
 ∪ {ea−i} −→ Ai
(recursively) as follows:
• ϑi
³
a∗−i,ti1
´
= a∗i,ti1
• ϑi
³
a∗−i,ti
Ti
´
= a∗i,ti
Ti
• For n > 1 such that a∗−i,tin ∈ [0,ea−i),
ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin
´
= max
½
max
n0<n
n
ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin0
´o
, a∗i,tin
¾
• For n < T i such that a∗−i,tin ∈
¡ea−i, a−i¤ ,
ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin
´
= max
½
max
n0>n
n
ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin0
´o
, a∗i,tin
¾
• For 1 < n < T i such that a∗−i,tin = ea−i,
ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin
´
= max
½
max
n0 6=n
n
ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin0
´o
, a∗i,tin
¾
• ϑi (ea−i) = maxn nϑi ³a∗−i,tin´o.
22This shows the meaning of the set T i0 : it contains the indices of the observations that
are non-redundant from the point of view of agent i, since he does not care about a−i. T i is
the set that contains the indices of all the observations that are relevant for i and contain the
most information, in terms of revealed preferences, because they have the largest domains.
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This mapping is single-valued and has the property that, for each n, n0 ∈©
1, ..., T i
ª
,
a∗−i,tin ∈ [0,ea−i]
a∗−i,tin0
6 a∗−i,tin
)
=⇒ ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin0
´
6 ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin
´
a∗−i,tin ∈
£ea−i, a−i¤
a∗−i,tin0
> a∗−i,tin
)
=⇒ ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin0
´
6 ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin
´
ϑi
³
a∗−i,tin
´
6 ϑi (ea−i)
Let li ⊆ A−i×Ai be the linear interpolation of the following finite sequence
on R2,n³
0, ϑi
³
a∗−i,ti1
´´
,
³
a∗−i,ti1 , ϑ
i
³
a∗−i,ti1
´´
, ...,
¡ea−i, ϑi (ea−i)¢ ,
...,
³
a∗−i,ti
Ti
, ϑi
³
a∗−i,ti
Ti
´´
,
³
a−i, ϑi
³
a∗−i,ti
Ti
´´o
the first components of whose elements are ordered increasingly. Let Φi :
A−i −→ Ai be the function whose graph is li. This function is well defined,
since
0 6 a∗−i,ti1 6 ea−i 6 a∗−i,tiTi 6 a−i
and ϑi is single-valued. Moreover, Φi has the following properties: it is contin-
uous, nondecreasing on [0,ea−i] and nonincreasing on £ea−i, a−i¤, and for each
t ∈ T i, Φi ¡a∗−i,t¢ > a∗i,t.
Define the function U i : Ai ×A−i −→ R by
U i (ai, a−i) = −
¡
ai − Φi (a−i)
¢2
I now show that
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set. It is immediate that
for each i ∈ I, U i is continuous and ∀a−i ∈ A−i, U i (·, a−i) is diﬀerentiable and
strongly concave. Then, I only need to show that
(∀t ∈ T ) (∀i ∈ I) : a∗i,t ∈ Arg maxai∈[0,ai,t]U
i ¡ai, a∗−i,t¢
Fix t ∈ T and i ∈ I.
Suppose first that t ∈ T i. If Φi ¡a∗−i,t¢ = a∗i,t, the result is obvious. Else,
if a∗−i,t ∈ [0,ea−i), Φi ¡a∗−i,t¢ > a∗i,t implies that for some t0 ∈ T i, a∗−i,t0 < a∗−i,t
and a∗i,t0 > a∗i,t. Then, by condition (3), a∗i,t = ai,t < Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
, from where©
a∗i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
If, on the other hand, a∗−i,t ∈
¡ea−i, a−i¤, Φi ¡a∗−i,t¢ > a∗i,t implies that for some
t0 ∈ T i, a∗−i,t0 > a∗−i,t and a∗i,t0 > a∗i,t. Then, by condition (4), a∗i,t = ai,t <
Φi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
, from where, as before,©
a∗i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
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Finally, if a∗−i,t = ea−i, Φi ¡a∗−i,t¢ > a∗i,t implies that either for some t0 ∈ T i,
a∗−i,t0 < a∗−i,t and a∗i,t0 > a∗i,t or for some t0 ∈ T i, a∗−i,t0 > a∗−i,t and a∗i,t0 > a∗i,t,
and the results follows according to the corresponding previous case.
Suppose now that t ∈ T i0 \T i = T i1 \T i2 .23 By construction, ∃t0 ∈ T i1 such
that a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t and ai,t0 > ai,t. Let
t0t ∈ Argmax
t0∈T 1i
©
ai,t0 | a∗−i,t0 = a∗−i,t
ª
By construction, t0t ∈ T i2 ⊆ T i, ai,t0t > ai,t and a∗−i,t0t = a
∗
−i,t, so that ∀ai ∈ Ai:
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
= U i
³
ai, a∗−i,t0t
´
= −
³
ai − Φi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´´2
whereas a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t] ⊂
£
0, ai,t0t
¤
, so that if a∗−i,t0t ∈ [0, ai,t], then, by condition
(1), a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t and, therefore,©
a∗i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
follows from the previous case. If, alternatively, a∗−i,t0t /∈ [0, ai,t], then, by con-
dition (2), a∗i,t = ai,t and, since ai,t < a∗i,t0t 6 Φ
i
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
, again©
a∗i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
Finally, consider t ∈ T \T i0 . Again, ∃t0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1} such that a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0 ,
a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ] and a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]. Let
t0t = min
©
t0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}| a∗−i,t = a∗−i,t0 , a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ] , a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]
ª
23This, because
T i0 \T i = T i0 \
¡¡T i0 \T i1 ¢ ∪ T i2 ¢
= T i0 ∩
¡¡T i0 \T i1 ¢ ∪ T i2 ¢c
= T i0 ∩
³¡T i0 \T i1 ¢c ∩ ¡T i2 ¢c´
= T i0 ∩
³³
T i0 ∩
¡T i1 ¢c´c ∩ ¡T i2 ¢c´
= T i0 ∩
³¡T i0 ¢c ∪ T i1 ´ ∩ ¡T i2 ¢c
= T i1 ∩
¡T i2 ¢c
= T i1 \T i2
where all complements are taken relatively to T i0 .
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By construction, t0t ∈ T i0 and then, by the previous two cases, and condition (1),©
a∗i,t
ª
=
n
a∗i,t0t
o
= Arg max
ai∈
h
0,ai,t0t
i U i ³ai, a∗−i,t0t´
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
All that remains to show is that each U i exhibits strategic complementarity
on [0,ea−i] and strategic substitutability on £ea−i, a−i¤. Fix i ∈ I and a0i ∈ Ai.
By construction,
∂U i
∂ai
(a0i, ·) = −2
¡
a0i − Φi (·)
¢
which is nondecreasing on [0,ea−i] and nonincreasing on £ea−i, a−i¤.
Hence, when the hypotheses of strategic complementarity and substitutabil-
ity can be plausibly assumed, they strengthen the test of corollary 3, as they
can themselves be tested. Their intuition is straightforward: on the part of
the domain of individual i in which he experiences strategic complementarity
(substitutability), if his opponent increases (decreases) the value of his action,
then i himself must increase his action, if allowed to do so. This is RSC (RSS).
It is straightforward to see that the restrictions derived from these extra
assumptions are not “zero measure” and hence the conclusion of subsection 3.3
does not follow here. It is also simple to see that one can impose other struc-
tures of complementarity and substitutability, in which case suitably modified
restrictions will arise.
5.2 Stronger testable restrictions:
In the results obtained in section 3, players make very fine distinctions regarding
the actions of their opponents. They do care, for example, for the exact value
of the action of each opponent and treat their opponents distinctly, with careful
consideration for who they are. Although this may be acceptable in many
situations (for example if the actions of others are not physically comparable,
or if one opponent is a good friend, or a partner in a joint venture of one firm, and
the other opponent is an enemy, or the competitor of the firm) it may also be too
extreme in other cases: individual actions may be physically comparable, and
players may care about the values of the actions of the opponents, regardless of
the names that those actions have attached (eﬀectively treating their opponents
as mutual substitutes,) or they may care about the actions of only some, or
none, of their opponents, or about just an aggregate of their actions. I now show
that these types of assumptions may yield stronger versions of the conditions of
corollary 3.
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5.2.1 Aggregation:
I first consider the case in which each individual only cares about his own action
and an aggregate of his opponents choices. I assume for the remainder of this
subsection that ∀i ∈ I, ai = a. Denote A =
£
0, a
¤
and A− =
£
0, a
¤I−1
. I
consider general aggregators, which are defined as follows:
Definition 7 A function σ : A− −→ S, where S ⊆ Rn, n ∈ N, is an aggregator
for U : A×A− −→ R if for each ai, a0i ∈ A−
σ (ai) = σ (a0i) =⇒ (∀a ∈ A) : U (a, ai) = U (a, a0i)
Now, suppose that one has theoretical reasons to assume that each individual
i ∈ I only cares about his own choice, and an aggregate σi of the choices of his
opponents, where σi : A− −→ Si, for Si ⊆ Rni , ni ∈ N. Then, the definition of
Nash-rationalizability must be modified accordingly.
Definition 8 Let σ=
¡
σi : RI−1+ −→ Si
¢
i∈I be a profile of continuous aggrega-
tors. A data set ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable with σ-aggregation if there exists
¡
U i
¢
i∈I that Nash-
rationalizes it, such that for each i ∈ I, σi is an aggregator for U i.
Intuition suggests that all the restrictions of Nash behavior in this context
should be modified versions of the restrictions of corollary 3, strengthened so
that, for each i ∈ I, it is not the profile of actions of i’s opponents, but its
aggregate according to σi that conditions them. The following theorem confirms
this intuition.
Theorem 5 Let σ=
¡
σi : RI−1+ −→ Si
¢
i∈I be a profile of continuous aggrega-
tors. A data set ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable with σ-aggregation if, and only if, for each t, t0 ∈ T and
each i ∈ I the following conditions are satisfied:
1. σ-conditional WARP (σ-CWARP):
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t = a∗i,t0
2. σ-conditional Revealed Increasing Monotonicity (σ-CRIM):
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
a∗i,t /∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
¾
=⇒ a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
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Proof. Necessity: Suppose not. Let
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalize the data, as-
suming that ∀i ∈ I, U i satisfies that¡
∀ai, a0i ∈ A− : σi (ai) = σi (a0i)
¢
(∀a ∈ A) : U i (a, ai) = U i (a, a0i)
Suppose that ∃i ∈ I and ∃t, t0 ∈ T such that σi ¡a∗−i,t¢ = σi ¡a∗−i,t0¢, a∗i,t ∈
[0, ai,t0 ], a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t] and a∗i,t 6= a∗i,t0 . Without loss of generality, assume that
U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
6 U i
¡
a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t0
¢
. Since σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
, the latter im-
plies that U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
6 U i
¡
a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t
¢
. Let ai = 12
¡
a∗i,t + a∗i,t0
¢
. Clearly,
ai ∈ [0, ai,t] whereas by strong concavity U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
> U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
, con-
tradicting the fact that
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set. This proves
condition (1).
Now, for condition (2), suppose that ∃i ∈ I and ∃t, t0 ∈ T such that
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
, a∗i,t /∈ [0, ai,t0 ] and a∗i,t0 < ai,t0 . Then, it follows that
ai,t0 < ai,t. Also, since a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t0 ] ⊂ [0, ai,t], it follows that if
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-
rationalizes the data set, then U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t
¢
> U i
¡
a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t
¢
. Moreover, since
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
, the latter implies that U i
¡
a∗i,t, a∗−i,t0
¢
> U i
¡
a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t0
¢
and, then, by strong concavity,
(∀λ ∈ (0, 1)) : U i
¡
λa∗i,t + (1− λ) a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t0
¢
> U i
¡
a∗i,t0 , a∗−i,t0
¢
whereas for λ close enough to 0, λa∗i,t+(1− λ) a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t0 ], contradicting the
fact that
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data.
Suﬃciency: Fix i ∈ I. Define the set T i as follows:
• τ i1 = {1}
• For t ∈ {2, ..., T} ,
τ it =



∅ if (∃t0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}) :



σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]
{t} otherwise
• T i0 =
TS
t=1
τ it
• T i1 =
©
t ∈ T i0
¯¯ ¡
∃t0 ∈ T i0 \ {t}
¢
: σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢ª
• T i2 =
©
t ∈ T i1
¯¯ ¡
∀t0 ∈ T i1 : σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢¢
: ai,t0 6 ai,t
ª
• T i = ¡T i0 \T i1 ¢ ∪ T i2
It follows by construction that if t ∈ T i0 \T i1 , then¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\ {t}¢ : σi ¡a∗−i,t0¢ 6= σi ¡a∗−i,t¢
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since T i ⊆ T i0 . Moreover, if t, t0 ∈ T i2 , t 6= t0, are such that σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
=
σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
, then, by construction, a−i,t = a−i,t0 , and, therefore a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
and a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]. But this is impossible since, assuming without loss of gener-
ality that t < t0, then τ it0 = ∅ and t0 /∈ T i0 . Then, we conclude that¡
∀t, t0 ∈ T i : t 6= t0¢ : σi ¡a∗−i,t¢ 6= σi ¡a∗−i,t0¢
Define Ci =
©
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢ª
t∈T i ⊆ σ
i [A−]. By the previous result, the function
φi : Ci −→ A, defined by θi
¡
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢¢
= a∗i,t, for each t ∈ T i, is well defined.24
Since Ci is closed, and φi is (trivially) continuous and bounded, it follows from
Tietze’s extension theorem that there exists a continuous extension of φi to the
whole of σi [A−]. Let Φi : σi [A−] −→ A be one such extension.
24By using this function, I am giving up the possibility of ensuring a local uniqueness
result analogous to theorem 2. If such a result is wanted, one can reason as follows: since
#T i 6 T <∞, we have that
εi := min
t,t0∈T i:t6=t0
³°°°σi ¡a∗−i,t¢ − σi ³a∗−i,t0´°°°´ > 0
Fix εi ∈ (0, εi). Since σi is continuous and #T i <∞, ∃δi ∈ R++ such that¡
∀t ∈ T i
¢
(∀a−i ∈ A−) :
°°a−i − a∗−i,t°° 6 δi =⇒ °°σi (a−i)− σi ¡a∗−i,t¢°° < εi
Define the set
Ci :=
[
t∈T i
B δi
2
³
a∗−i,t
´
∩A−
and the function φi : Ci −→ Ai by
φi (a−i) := min



Arg max
ai∈
n
a∗i,t
o
t∈T i
µ
min
t0∈T i
µ³°°°σi (a−i)− σi ³a∗−i,t0´°°° − εi2 ´ ³ai − a∗i,t0´2
¶¶

One first shows that¡
∀t ∈ T i¢ µ∀a−i ∈ B δi
2
³
a∗−i,t
´
∩A−
¶
: φi (a−i) = a∗i,t
To see this, let t ∈ T i and a−i ∈ B δi
2
³
a∗−i,t
´
∩ A−. Consider, for each ai ∈
n
a∗i,t00
o
t00∈T i
,
the problem
min
t0∈T i
µ³°°°σi (a−i)− σi ³a∗−i,t0´°°° − εi2 ´ ³ai − a∗i,t0´2
¶
By construction, definition of δi and εi and triangle inequality¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\ {t}¢ : °°°σi (a−i)− σi ³a∗−i,t0´°°° > εi2
whereas °°σi (a−i)− σi ¡a∗−i,t¢°° 6 εi2
which suﬃces to imply that
min
t0∈T i
µ³°°°a−i − a∗−i,t0°°° − εi2 ´ ³ai − a∗i,t0´2
¶
=
³°°a−i − a∗−i,t°° − εi2 ´ ¡ai − a∗i,t¢2
and therefore that φi (a−i) = a∗i,t. From here on, the proof carries on.
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Define now U i : A×A− −→ R by
U i (ai, a−i) = −
¡
ai − Φi
¡
σi (a−i)
¢¢2
Clearly, U i is continuous and satisfies that¡
∀ai, a0i ∈ A− : σi (ai) = σi (a0i)
¢
(∀a ∈ A) : U i (a, ai) = U i (a, a0i)
I now only have to show that, so defined,
¡
U i
¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data
set. It is immediate that ∀a−i ∈ A−, the function U i (·, a−i) is diﬀerentiable
and strongly concave. In order to show that
(∀t ∈ T ) : ¡a∗i,t¢i∈I ∈ N ³¡[0, ai,t] , U iat¢i∈I´
I have to show that
(∀t ∈ T ) (∀i ∈ I) : a∗i,t ∈ Arg maxai∈[0,ai,t]U
i ¡ai, a∗−i,t¢
Hence, fix t ∈ T and i ∈ I.
Suppose first that t ∈ T i. By construction,
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
= −
¡
ai − Φi
¡
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢¢¢2
= −
¡
ai − φi
¡
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢¢¢2
= −
¡
ai − a∗i,t
¢2
from where the result is obvious.
Secondly, consider t ∈ T i0 \T i = T i1 \T i2 .25 Then, by construction, ∃t0 ∈ T i1
such that σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
and ai,t0 > ai,t. Let
t0t ∈ Arg max
t0∈T 1i
©
ai,t0 |σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢ª
By construction, t0t ∈ T i2 ⊆ T i, ai,t0t > ai,t and σi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
, so that
∀ai ∈ A :
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
= −
¡
ai − Φi
¡
σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢¢¢2
= −
³
ai − Φi
³
σi
³
a∗−i,t0t
´´´2
= −
³
ai − a∗i,t0t
´2
whereas a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t] ⊂
£
0, ai,t0t
¤
, so that if a∗i,t0t ∈ [0, ai,t], then by condition (1)
of the theorem a∗i,t = a∗i,t0t and, therefore©
a∗i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
25 See note 23.
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If, alternatively, a∗i,t0t /∈ [0, ai,t], then, by condition (2) of the theorem, a
∗
i,t = ai,t
and, since ai,t < a∗i,t0t , again©
a∗i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
Finally, suppose that t ∈ T \T i0 . Then, by construction, ∃t0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}
such that σi
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
= σi
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
, a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ] and a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]. Let
t0t = min
©
t0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}|σi ¡a∗−i,t¢ = σi ¡a∗−i,t0¢ , a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ] , a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]ª
By construction, t0t ∈ T i0 and then, by the previous two cases and condition (1),©
a∗i,t
ª
=
n
a∗i,t0t
o
= Arg max
ai∈
h
0,ai,t0t
i U i ³ai, a∗−i,t0t´
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
U i
¡
ai, a∗−i,t
¢
The importance of this result is that its testable restrictions need not have
“zero measure.” For this, it suﬃces that for some player i ∈ I there exist a
subset of A−, with positive Lebesgue measure, where the image of aggregator
σi is constant. In such a case, the experiment of generating individual choices
randomly, using uniform distributions, no longer generates rationalizable data
sets with probability one. This probability now decreases as the measure of
those level sets of the aggregators increases. The harshness of the test then
depends on the Lebesgue measure of the level sets of the aggregators.
5.2.2 Example: Anonymity
A simple example of aggregation is the following. Consider a game in which
actions taken by all players are physically comparable, and each player i ∈ I
treats the other players anonymously in the sense that if a−i, a0−i ∈ A− are
such that the only diﬀerence between the two of them is the order of their
components, then for each a ∈ Ai, player i is indiﬀerent between (a, a−i) and¡
a, a0−i
¢
.
Define the set O =
©
b ∈ RI−1+
¯¯
(∀l ∈ {2, ..., I − 1}) : bl−1 6 bl
ª
, in which all
the vectors are ordered ascendingly. Let the function o : RI−1+ −→ O reorder
the elements of vectors in RI−1+ . That is,
a 7−→ o (a) = (o1 (a) , o2 (a) , ..., oI−1 (a))
such that ¡
∀a ∈ RI−1+
¢
(∀l ∈ {2, ..., I − 1}) : ol−1 (a) 6 ol (a)
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and ¡
∀a ∈ RI−1+
¢
(∀l ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}) (∃l0 ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}) : ol (a) = al0¡
∀a ∈ RI−1+
¢
(∀l ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}) (∃l0 ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}) : al = ol0 (a)
The idea of anonymity is that what each player cares about is the components
of the vectors of choices of his opponents, regardless of their order. Then, define:
Definition 9 Two vectors a−i, a0−i ∈ A− are anonymously equivalent if
o (a−i) = o
¡
a0−i
¢
Consequently, under the Nash hypothesis, individuals behave according to
anonymity if their preferences satisfy the following condition.
Definition 10 A function U : A × A− −→ R satisfies anonymity if o is an
aggregator for U .
Again, one must modify the definition of Nash-rationalizability so as to re-
quire that preferences satisfy anonymity. The natural definition is:
Definition 11 A data set ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable with anonymity (NRWA) if there exists
¡
U i
¢
i∈I that Nash-
rationalizes it such that ∀i ∈ I, U i satisfies anonymity.
Given that the function o is continuous,26 the following result follows straight-
forwardly from theorem 5.
Corollary 4 A data set ³¡
a∗i,t, ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is NRWA if, and only if, ∀t, t0 ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. Anonymous CWARP (ACWARP):
o
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= o
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
a∗i,t ∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
a∗i,t0 ∈ [0, ai,t]


 =⇒ a
∗
i,t = a∗i,t0
26Actually, uniformly continuous: since ∀a, a0 ∈ RI−1+ ,
PI−1
i=1 oi (a) oi (a
0) >
PI−1
i=1 aia
0
i, it
is easy to show that ∀a, a0 ∈ RI−1+ , ko (a)− o (a0)k 6 ka− a0k. Then, by letting δ = ε it
follows that
(∀ε ∈ R++) (∃δ ∈ R++)
³
∀a ∈ RI−1+
´ ³
∀a0 ∈ Bδ (a) ∩ RI−1+
´
:
°°o (a)− o ¡a0¢°° < ε
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2. Anonymous CRIM (ACRIM):
o
¡
a∗−i,t
¢
= o
¡
a∗−i,t0
¢
a∗i,t /∈ [0, ai,t0 ]
¾
=⇒ a∗i,t0 = ai,t0
Proof. Let σ=(o : A− −→ O)i∈I . This is a profile of continuous aggregators,
and the result then follows from theorem 5
It must be noticed, however, that anonymity does not increase the power of
the test of corollary 3, since all level sets for the anonymous aggregator, o, are
finite and, hence, have zero Lebesgue measure.
5.3 Example: Cournot competition.
As a simple example of a problem in which issues of aggregation and strate-
gic substitutability are present, consider the following (slightly nonstandard)
oligopoly problem. Consider an industry composed by a set I of firms. Each
firm has a structural maximal production capacity q. At time t, firm i de-
cides how much to produce (q∗i,t), subject to a short-term capacity constraint
qi ∈
£
0, qi,t
¤
⊆
£
0, q
¤
, taking as given the aggregate production of the rest of the
industry (
P
j∈I\{i} q∗j,t), so as to solve the problem
max
qi∈[0,qi,t]
πi
¡
qi, q∗−i,t
¢
where πi : A×A− −→ R is a profit function that satisfies the following proper-
ties:27
1. It is continuous,
2. ∀q−i ∈ A−, the function πi (·, q−i) : A −→ R is diﬀerentiable and strongly
concave,
3.
¡
∀q−i, q0−i ∈ A−
¢
:X
j∈I\{i}
qj =
X
j∈I\{i}
q0j =⇒ (∀q0 ∈ A) : πi (q, q−i) = πi
¡
q, q0−i
¢
4.
¡
∀q−i, q0−i ∈ A−
¢
:
X
j∈I\{i}
qj 6
X
j∈I\{i}
q0j =⇒ (∀q0 ∈ A) :
∂πi
∂qi
(q, q−i) >
∂πi
∂qi
i ¡
q, q0−i
¢
27This is nonstandard in that I do not require that πi have the usual form
πi (qi, q−i) = d−1

X
j∈I
qj

 qi − ci (qi)
where d : R+ −→ R+ is a demand function and ci : R+ −→ R+ is a cost function.
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A data set is a finite time series of observed productions and short term
production capacities,
³¡
q∗i,t, qi,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
. It follows from combining theorems
5 and 4 that there exists a profile of profit functions
¡
πi
¢
i∈I such that ∀i ∈
I, πi satisfies the above conditions and ∀t ∈ T , (qi,t)i∈I is a Nash-Cournot
equilibrium of the market given capacity constraints
¡
qi,t
¢
i∈I if, and only if,
∀t, t0 ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I,
1. P
j∈I\{i} q∗j,t =
P
j∈I\{i} q∗j,t0
q∗i,t ∈
£
0, qi,t0
¤
q∗i,t0 ∈
£
0, qi,t
¤


 =⇒ q
∗
i,t = q∗i,t0
2. P
j∈I\{i} q∗j,t =
P
j∈I\{i} q∗j,t0
q∗i,t /∈
£
0, qi,t0
¤ ¾ =⇒ q∗i,t0 = qi,t0
3. X
j∈I\{i}
q∗j,t 6
X
j∈I\{i}
q∗j,t0 =⇒ q∗i,t ∈
£
min
©
qi,t, q∗i,t0
ª
, qi,t
¤
6 Concluding remarks:
This paper studied the problem of whether or not the hypothesis that individ-
uals behave as assumed by the concept of Nash equilibrium is falsifiable. The
question is relevant since, from an epistemological point of view, the unfalsifia-
bility of an idea casts doubts about its character of scientific knowledge. I have
considered here the case of a finite number of players, each of whom is endowed
with a continuous domain, perhaps subject to additional constraints. In order
to increase the empirical applicability of my results, I assumed that only a fi-
nite data set is observed, and used a weak criterion of rationalizability, so as to
avoid the assumption, whether implicit or explicit, that all the equilibria of the
games have been collected in the finite data set. The first result that I obtain
is that the hypothesis appears to be, in eﬀect, falsifiable, but that the extra
assumption that equilibria are locally unique cannot be tested. The conditions
that allow for falsification are suitably applied versions of the axioms of revealed
preference, which must hold for each individual, conditional on the actions of
his opponents. This conditionality is fairly intuitive, since only under it can
one ensure that the individual is maximizing the same utility function. When
players make very fine distinctions between the actions of their opponents, and
when the ordinal eﬀects of these actions on the payoﬀ function of the individual
are left unrestricted, the testable implications derived from Nash behavior are
seen to be extremely mild, to the point of rendering the theory unfalsifiable
form a practical perspective: if, against the null hypothesis, one lets a computer
generate a data set randomly, using nonatomic distributions, the probability of
obtaining a nonrationalizable data set is zero. Nonetheless, for the general case,
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these implications are all the restrictions that the theory imposes, as it is shown
that they are also suﬃcient conditions for rationalizability.
Then, the question that must be answered is whether the weak requirements
for rationalizability, the finesse with which agents distinguish actions of their
opponents and the arbitrariness allowed to ordinal eﬀects of the other players’
actions are appropriate assumptions in specific cases. I have chosen to main-
tain weak rationalizability requirements, in order to avoid having to defend
arguments that said that in the finite data set one has indeed observed all the
equilibria of the games over continuous domains. To my mind, a more conve-
nient route to explore is whether extra assumptions about how the payoﬀs of
individuals are aﬀected by actions of their opponents suﬃce to strengthen the
tests of the Nash hypothesis. Via examples, my findings are that, indeed, they
may.
7 Appendix: Parallel Hyperplanes.
In this appendix for each i ∈ {1, ..., I}, I < ∞, ei represents the ith canonical
unit vector in RI .
Lemma 1 For every finite set {at}Tt=1 ⊆ RI , there exists v ∈ RI++ such that
for each t, t0 ∈ T , t 6= t0, it is true that v · at 6= v · at0 .
Proof. Consider the following algorithm:
Algorithm 2 Input: {at}Tt=1
1. v = {1, ..., 1}, t = 1.
2. If (∀τ ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}) : v · aτ 6= v · at, go to 4.
3. Define bτ ∈ {τ ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}| v · aτ = v · at}bi = min { i ∈ {1, ..., I}| ai,bτ 6= ai,t}
γ = max
½
max
τ∈{1,...,t−1}
n¯¯¯
abi,τ − abi,t
¯¯¯o
, max
τ,τ 0∈{1,...,t−1}
n¯¯¯
abi,τ − abi,τ 0
¯¯¯o¾
If t = 2, define ε = 1. Else, define
ε = min
½
min
τ∈{1,...,t−1}\{bτ} {|v · aτ − v · at|} , minτ,τ 0∈{1,...,t−1},τ 6=τ 0 {|v · aτ − v · aτ 0 |}
¾
Define
κ = ε
2γ
v = v + κebi
4. If t = T , stop. Else, t = t+ 1 and go to 2.
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Output: v
Since T < 0, it is obvious that the algorithm runs in finite time. I now show
that the v resulting at the end of the algorithm satisfies v ∈ RI++ and that
∀t, t0 ∈ T , t 6= t0, it is true that v · at 6= v · at0 .
Fix t ∈ T . Suppose that before the tth pass through the algorithm, v ∈ RI++
is such that
(∀τ , τ 0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1} , τ 6= τ 0) : v · aτ 6= v · aτ 0
which is true when t 6 2.
If at step (2) of the algorithm it is true that ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., t− 1} : v ·aτ 6= v ·at,
then it is obvious from step 4 that before the t+1st pass through the algorithm
v ∈ RI++ and
(∀τ , τ 0 ∈ {1, ..., t} , τ 6= τ 0) : v · aτ 6= v · aτ 0
Now, suppose that the condition of step (2) does not hold. Then
(∃τ ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}) : v · aτ = v · at
This τ is obviously unique, and is what is defined as bτ at step (3).
Also, at step (3) it is obvious that ε 6= 0 if t = 2. Moreover for t > 3,
the fact that ε > 0 follows from the uniqueness of bτ and the assumption about
v before the tth pass through the algorithm. That bi is well defined follows
from the fact that bτ 6= t and the definition of set imply that abτ 6= at. Since
γ >
¯¯¯
abi,bτ − abi,t
¯¯¯
> 0 it follows that κ > 0.
In order to avoid confusion, define v∗ = v + κebi. Obviously, v∗ > v, so that
v∗ ∈ RI++. I now claim that the following three properties are satisfied by v∗:
(i)
v∗ · abτ 6= v∗ · at
(ii)
(∀τ ∈ {1, ..., t− 1} \ {bτ}) : v∗ · aτ 6= v∗ · at
(iii)
(∀τ , τ 0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1} , τ 6= τ 0) : v∗ · aτ 6= v∗ · aτ 0
For the claim (i), just notice that
v∗ · abτ − v∗ · at = v · abτ + κabi,bτ − v · at − κabi,t
= κ
³
abi,bτ − abi,t
´
6= 0
since v · abτ = v · at, κ > 0 and abi,bτ − abi,t 6= 0.
If t = 2, claims (ii) and (iii) are trivial. Hence I now assume that t > 3.
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Consider first claim (ii). Fix τ ∈ {1, ..., t− 1} \ {bτ}. By construction v ·aτ 6=
v · at. Suppose first that v · aτ < v · at. Then
v∗ · aτ − v∗ · at = v · aτ + κabi,τ − v · at − κabi,t
= v · aτ − v · at + κ
³
abi,τ − abi,t
´
6 v · aτ − v · at + κ
¯¯¯
abi,τ − abi,t
¯¯¯
6 v · aτ − v · at + κγ
= v · aτ − v · at + ε
2
≤ −ε+ ε
2
= −ε
2
< 0
where the sixth step follows since v·aτ−v·at = − |v · aτ − v · at| and |v · aτ − v · at| >
ε.
If, on the other hand, v · at < v · aτ , then
v∗ · at − v∗ · aτ = v · at + κabi,t − v · aτ − κabi,τ
= v · at − v · aτ + κ
³
abi,t − abi,τ
´
6 v · at − v · aτ + κ
¯¯¯
abi,t − abi,τ
¯¯¯
6 v · at − v · aτ + κγ
= v · at − v · aτ + ε
2
≤ −ε+ ε
2
= −ε
2
< 0
where the sixth step follows since v·at−v·aτ = − |v · at − v · aτ | and |v · at − v · aτ | >
ε.
For claim (iii), fix τ , τ 0 ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}, τ 6= τ 0. By assumption about v
before the tth pass through the algorithm, v ·aτ 6= v ·aτ 0 , so that we can assume
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without loss of generality that v · aτ < v · aτ 0 . As before,
v∗ · aτ − v∗ · aτ 0 = v · aτ + κabi,τ − v · aτ 0 − κabi,τ 0
= v · aτ − v · aτ 0 + κ
³
abi,τ − abi,τ 0
´
6 v · aτ − v · aτ 0 + κ
¯¯¯
abi,τ − abi,τ 0
¯¯¯
6 v · aτ − v · aτ 0 + κγ
= v · aτ − v · aτ 0 + ε
2
≤ −ε+ ε
2
= −ε
2
< 0
where the sixth step follows since v · aτ − v · aτ 0 = − |v · aτ − v · aτ 0 | and
|v · aτ − v · aτ 0 | > ε.
This claims show that before the t+ 1st pass through the algorithm
(∀τ , τ 0 ∈ {1, ..., t} , τ 6= τ 0) : v · aτ 6= v · aτ 0
8 Appendix: Construction of strongly concave
preferences.
Let I ∈ N. For a finite sequence (at, vt)Tt=1, where (∀t ∈ T ) : at ∈ RI+ and
vt ∈ RI++, define the following two conditions:
Condition 2 ∀N 6 T and ∀ {τ1, ..., τN} ⊆ T ,
¡
(∀n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) : vτn ·
¡
aτn+1 − aτn
¢
6 0
¢
=⇒



aτ1 = aτN
or
vτN · (aτ1 − aτN ) > 0
Condition 3 Besides condition 2,
(∀t, t0 ∈ T ) : vt 6= vt0 =⇒ at 6= at0
The following theorem is derived from a result in Chiappori and Rochet
(1987), which is obtained in a diﬀerent context, but has the same mathematical
content.
Theorem 6 If (at, vt)Tt=1 be a finite sequence, where (∀t ∈ T ) : at ∈ RI+ and
vt ∈ RI++, satisfies condition 3, then ∃V :
Q
i∈I
£
0, ai
¤
−→ R, diﬀerentiable and
strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: V (a) > V (at) =⇒ vt · a > vt · at
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and
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: vt · a < vt · at =⇒ V (a) < V (at)
Proof. Since
Q
i∈I
£
0, ai
¤
is compact, it follows from condition 3 and the theo-
rem in Chiappori and Rochet (1987),28 that there exists V :
Q
i∈I
£
0, ai
¤
−→ R,
infinitely diﬀerentiable and strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T ) : at ∈ Arg max
a∈RI+:vt·a6vt·at
V (a)
Now, fix t ∈ T and a ∈ Q
i∈I
Ai. If V (a) > V (at), it follows directly from the
previous condition that vt · a > vt · at. If, on the other hand, vt · a < vt · at and
V (a) > V (at), it then follows that ∀θ ∈ (0, 1)
vt · (θa+ (1− θ) at) < vt · at
whereas, by strong concavity,
V (θa+ (1− θ) at) > V (at)
which contradicts the previous condition.
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